x86/shstk: Add Kconfig option for shadow stack
authorRick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Tue, 13 Jun 2023 00:10:32 +0000 (17:10 -0700)
committerRick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Tue, 11 Jul 2023 21:12:18 +0000 (14:12 -0700)
commit18e66b695e787374ca762ecdeaa1ab5e3772af94
treefe0c977a5b99541f1cb81dc32f97758d2b5ce799
parentfb47a799cc5ccc469c63e9174f2ad555a21ba2a1
x86/shstk: Add Kconfig option for shadow stack

Shadow stack provides protection for applications against function return
address corruption. It is active when the processor supports it, the
kernel has CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK enabled, and the application is built
for the feature. This is only implemented for the 64-bit kernel. When it
is enabled, legacy non-shadow stack applications continue to work, but
without protection.

Since there is another feature that utilizes CET (Kernel IBT) that will
share implementation with shadow stacks, create CONFIG_CET to signify
that at least one CET feature is configured.

Co-developed-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>
Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230613001108.3040476-7-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com
arch/x86/Kconfig
arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler