x86/speculation/srbds: Update SRBDS mitigation selection
authorPawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Fri, 20 May 2022 03:33:13 +0000 (20:33 -0700)
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Thu, 16 Jun 2022 11:30:34 +0000 (13:30 +0200)
commit30120b433c1f53cd0a081e6e86fe016a60a423fc
tree86f0101795c66e1dc6d5694a0fb44752a2b569f0
parent531eb5fe3171f11cece79c7aac28bb5a085fb3fa
x86/speculation/srbds: Update SRBDS mitigation selection

commit 22cac9c677c95f3ac5c9244f8ca0afdc7c8afb19 upstream

Currently, Linux disables SRBDS mitigation on CPUs not affected by
MDS and have the TSX feature disabled. On such CPUs, secrets cannot
be extracted from CPU fill buffers using MDS or TAA. Without SRBDS
mitigation, Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities can be used to
extract RDRAND, RDSEED, and EGETKEY data.

Do not disable SRBDS mitigation by default when CPU is also affected by
Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities.

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c