x86/speculation: Do not enable Automatic IBRS if SEV-SNP is enabled
authorKim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Fri, 26 Jan 2024 04:11:02 +0000 (22:11 -0600)
committerBorislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Mon, 29 Jan 2024 16:19:01 +0000 (17:19 +0100)
commitacaa4b5c4c854b5009f4d4a5395b2609ad0f4937
treee692d6d999c4ac18a9648ca15aad5ed51e3b39b8
parentb6e0f6666f74f0794530e3557f5b0a4ce37bd556
x86/speculation: Do not enable Automatic IBRS if SEV-SNP is enabled

Without SEV-SNP, Automatic IBRS protects only the kernel. But when
SEV-SNP is enabled, the Automatic IBRS protection umbrella widens to all
host-side code, including userspace. This protection comes at a cost:
reduced userspace indirect branch performance.

To avoid this performance loss, don't use Automatic IBRS on SEV-SNP
hosts and all back to retpolines instead.

  [ mdr: squash in changes from review discussion. ]

Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240126041126.1927228-3-michael.roth@amd.com
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c