x86/speculation: Warn about eIBRS + LFENCE + Unprivileged eBPF + SMT
authorJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Fri, 25 Feb 2022 22:32:28 +0000 (14:32 -0800)
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Fri, 11 Mar 2022 11:22:32 +0000 (12:22 +0100)
commitbf048d1921b6cdc50bfc5a1b21b6fdd2d22e1fe1
tree99948153ec5cfe13630724d99c774776715eb35a
parent074d7260463962b44a8b8a61dcdd6ef513022e88
x86/speculation: Warn about eIBRS + LFENCE + Unprivileged eBPF + SMT

commit 0de05d056afdb00eca8c7bbb0c79a3438daf700c upstream.

The commit

   44a3918c8245 ("x86/speculation: Include unprivileged eBPF status in Spectre v2 mitigation reporting")

added a warning for the "eIBRS + unprivileged eBPF" combination, which
has been shown to be vulnerable against Spectre v2 BHB-based attacks.

However, there's no warning about the "eIBRS + LFENCE retpoline +
unprivileged eBPF" combo. The LFENCE adds more protection by shortening
the speculation window after a mispredicted branch. That makes an attack
significantly more difficult, even with unprivileged eBPF. So at least
for now the logic doesn't warn about that combination.

But if you then add SMT into the mix, the SMT attack angle weakens the
effectiveness of the LFENCE considerably.

So extend the "eIBRS + unprivileged eBPF" warning to also include the
"eIBRS + LFENCE + unprivileged eBPF + SMT" case.

  [ bp: Massage commit message. ]

Suggested-by: Alyssa Milburn <alyssa.milburn@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c