Bluetooth: stop proccessing malicious adv data
authorPavel Skripkin <paskripkin@gmail.com>
Mon, 1 Nov 2021 07:12:12 +0000 (10:12 +0300)
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Thu, 27 Jan 2022 10:03:11 +0000 (11:03 +0100)
[ Upstream commit 3a56ef719f0b9682afb8a86d64b2399e36faa4e6 ]

Syzbot reported slab-out-of-bounds read in hci_le_adv_report_evt(). The
problem was in missing validaion check.

We should check if data is not malicious and we can read next data block.
If we won't check ptr validness, code can read a way beyond skb->end and
it can cause problems, of course.

Fixes: e95beb414168 ("Bluetooth: hci_le_adv_report_evt code refactoring")
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+e3fcb9c4f3c2a931dc40@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Pavel Skripkin <paskripkin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
net/bluetooth/hci_event.c

index 0bca035bf2dcc20340b228419b6c7d67a43c8952..50d1d62c15ec8053db8a28db413a58cc437f02e7 100644 (file)
@@ -5780,7 +5780,8 @@ static void hci_le_adv_report_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb)
                struct hci_ev_le_advertising_info *ev = ptr;
                s8 rssi;
 
-               if (ev->length <= HCI_MAX_AD_LENGTH) {
+               if (ev->length <= HCI_MAX_AD_LENGTH &&
+                   ev->data + ev->length <= skb_tail_pointer(skb)) {
                        rssi = ev->data[ev->length];
                        process_adv_report(hdev, ev->evt_type, &ev->bdaddr,
                                           ev->bdaddr_type, NULL, 0, rssi,
@@ -5790,6 +5791,11 @@ static void hci_le_adv_report_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb)
                }
 
                ptr += sizeof(*ev) + ev->length + 1;
+
+               if (ptr > (void *) skb_tail_pointer(skb) - sizeof(*ev)) {
+                       bt_dev_err(hdev, "Malicious advertising data. Stopping processing");
+                       break;
+               }
        }
 
        hci_dev_unlock(hdev);