The new Merkle tree construction algorithm is a bit fragile in that it
may overflow the 'root_hash' array if the tree actually generated does
not match the calculated tree parameters.
This should never happen unless there is a filesystem bug that allows
the file size to change despite deny_write_access(), or a bug in the
Merkle tree logic itself. Regardless, it's fairly easy to check for
buffer overflow here, so let's do so.
This is a robustness improvement only; this case is not currently known
to be reachable. I've added a Fixes tag anyway, since I recommend that
this be included in kernels that have the mentioned commit.
Fixes: 56124d6c87fd ("fsverity: support enabling with tree block size < PAGE_SIZE")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230328041505.110162-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
struct block_buffer {
u32 filled;
+ bool is_root_hash;
u8 *data;
};
struct block_buffer *next = cur + 1;
int err;
+ /*
+ * Safety check to prevent a buffer overflow in case of a filesystem bug
+ * that allows the file size to change despite deny_write_access(), or a
+ * bug in the Merkle tree logic itself
+ */
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(next->is_root_hash && next->filled != 0))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
/* Zero-pad the block if it's shorter than the block size. */
memset(&cur->data[cur->filled], 0, params->block_size - cur->filled);
}
}
buffers[num_levels].data = root_hash;
+ buffers[num_levels].is_root_hash = true;
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(level_offset) != sizeof(params->level_start));
memcpy(level_offset, params->level_start, sizeof(level_offset));