ipv4: prevent potential spectre v1 gadget in fib_metrics_match()
authorEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Fri, 20 Jan 2023 13:31:40 +0000 (13:31 +0000)
committerJakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Tue, 24 Jan 2023 05:37:39 +0000 (21:37 -0800)
if (!type)
        continue;
    if (type > RTAX_MAX)
        return false;
    ...
    fi_val = fi->fib_metrics->metrics[type - 1];

@type being used as an array index, we need to prevent
cpu speculation or risk leaking kernel memory content.

Fixes: 5f9ae3d9e7e4 ("ipv4: do metrics match when looking up and deleting a route")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230120133140.3624204-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c

index ce9ff3c62e84055393ca1ff98f1d2ae391978638..3bb890a40ed73626acba8c22044d1c5f99c872e8 100644 (file)
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/netlink.h>
 #include <linux/hash.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
 
 #include <net/arp.h>
 #include <net/inet_dscp.h>
@@ -1022,6 +1023,7 @@ bool fib_metrics_match(struct fib_config *cfg, struct fib_info *fi)
                if (type > RTAX_MAX)
                        return false;
 
+               type = array_index_nospec(type, RTAX_MAX + 1);
                if (type == RTAX_CC_ALGO) {
                        char tmp[TCP_CA_NAME_MAX];
                        bool ecn_ca = false;