# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+obj-$(CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_CC_PLATFORM) += coco/
+
obj-y += entry/
obj-$(CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS) += events/
--- /dev/null
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+CFLAGS_REMOVE_core.o = -pg
+KASAN_SANITIZE_core.o := n
+CFLAGS_core.o += -fno-stack-protector
+
+obj-y += core.o
--- /dev/null
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Confidential Computing Platform Capability checks
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2021 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.
+ *
+ * Author: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/cc_platform.h>
+#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
+
+#include <asm/mshyperv.h>
+#include <asm/processor.h>
+
+static bool __maybe_unused intel_cc_platform_has(enum cc_attr attr)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_GUEST
+ return false;
+#else
+ return false;
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * SME and SEV are very similar but they are not the same, so there are
+ * times that the kernel will need to distinguish between SME and SEV. The
+ * cc_platform_has() function is used for this. When a distinction isn't
+ * needed, the CC_ATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT attribute can be used.
+ *
+ * The trampoline code is a good example for this requirement. Before
+ * paging is activated, SME will access all memory as decrypted, but SEV
+ * will access all memory as encrypted. So, when APs are being brought
+ * up under SME the trampoline area cannot be encrypted, whereas under SEV
+ * the trampoline area must be encrypted.
+ */
+static bool amd_cc_platform_has(enum cc_attr attr)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
+ switch (attr) {
+ case CC_ATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT:
+ return sme_me_mask;
+
+ case CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT:
+ return sme_me_mask && !(sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED);
+
+ case CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT:
+ return sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED;
+
+ case CC_ATTR_GUEST_STATE_ENCRYPT:
+ return sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_ENABLED;
+
+ /*
+ * With SEV, the rep string I/O instructions need to be unrolled
+ * but SEV-ES supports them through the #VC handler.
+ */
+ case CC_ATTR_GUEST_UNROLL_STRING_IO:
+ return (sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED) &&
+ !(sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_ENABLED);
+
+ default:
+ return false;
+ }
+#else
+ return false;
+#endif
+}
+
+static bool hyperv_cc_platform_has(enum cc_attr attr)
+{
+ return attr == CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT;
+}
+
+bool cc_platform_has(enum cc_attr attr)
+{
+ if (sme_me_mask)
+ return amd_cc_platform_has(attr);
+
+ if (hv_is_isolation_supported())
+ return hyperv_cc_platform_has(attr);
+
+ return false;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(cc_platform_has);
CFLAGS_REMOVE_early_printk.o = -pg
CFLAGS_REMOVE_head64.o = -pg
CFLAGS_REMOVE_sev.o = -pg
-CFLAGS_REMOVE_cc_platform.o = -pg
endif
KASAN_SANITIZE_head$(BITS).o := n
KASAN_SANITIZE_stacktrace.o := n
KASAN_SANITIZE_paravirt.o := n
KASAN_SANITIZE_sev.o := n
-KASAN_SANITIZE_cc_platform.o := n
# With some compiler versions the generated code results in boot hangs, caused
# by several compilation units. To be safe, disable all instrumentation.
KCOV_INSTRUMENT := n
CFLAGS_head$(BITS).o += -fno-stack-protector
-CFLAGS_cc_platform.o += -fno-stack-protector
CFLAGS_irq.o := -I $(srctree)/$(src)/../include/asm/trace
obj-$(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT) += sev.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_CC_PLATFORM) += cc_platform.o
-
###
# 64 bit specific files
ifeq ($(CONFIG_X86_64),y)
+++ /dev/null
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
-/*
- * Confidential Computing Platform Capability checks
- *
- * Copyright (C) 2021 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.
- *
- * Author: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
- */
-
-#include <linux/export.h>
-#include <linux/cc_platform.h>
-#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
-
-#include <asm/mshyperv.h>
-#include <asm/processor.h>
-
-static bool __maybe_unused intel_cc_platform_has(enum cc_attr attr)
-{
-#ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_GUEST
- return false;
-#else
- return false;
-#endif
-}
-
-/*
- * SME and SEV are very similar but they are not the same, so there are
- * times that the kernel will need to distinguish between SME and SEV. The
- * cc_platform_has() function is used for this. When a distinction isn't
- * needed, the CC_ATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT attribute can be used.
- *
- * The trampoline code is a good example for this requirement. Before
- * paging is activated, SME will access all memory as decrypted, but SEV
- * will access all memory as encrypted. So, when APs are being brought
- * up under SME the trampoline area cannot be encrypted, whereas under SEV
- * the trampoline area must be encrypted.
- */
-static bool amd_cc_platform_has(enum cc_attr attr)
-{
-#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
- switch (attr) {
- case CC_ATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT:
- return sme_me_mask;
-
- case CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT:
- return sme_me_mask && !(sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED);
-
- case CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT:
- return sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED;
-
- case CC_ATTR_GUEST_STATE_ENCRYPT:
- return sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_ENABLED;
-
- /*
- * With SEV, the rep string I/O instructions need to be unrolled
- * but SEV-ES supports them through the #VC handler.
- */
- case CC_ATTR_GUEST_UNROLL_STRING_IO:
- return (sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED) &&
- !(sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_ENABLED);
-
- default:
- return false;
- }
-#else
- return false;
-#endif
-}
-
-static bool hyperv_cc_platform_has(enum cc_attr attr)
-{
- return attr == CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT;
-}
-
-bool cc_platform_has(enum cc_attr attr)
-{
- if (sme_me_mask)
- return amd_cc_platform_has(attr);
-
- if (hv_is_isolation_supported())
- return hyperv_cc_platform_has(attr);
-
- return false;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(cc_platform_has);