x86/speculation: Identify processors vulnerable to SMT RSB predictions

commit be8de49bea505e7777a69ef63d60e02ac1712683 upstream.

Certain AMD processors are vulnerable to a cross-thread return address
predictions bug. When running in SMT mode and one of the sibling threads
transitions out of C0 state, the other sibling thread could use return
target predictions from the sibling thread that transitioned out of C0.

The Spectre v2 mitigations cover the Linux kernel, as it fills the RSB
when context switching to the idle thread. However, KVM allows a VMM to
prevent exiting guest mode when transitioning out of C0. A guest could
act maliciously in this situation, so create a new x86 BUG that can be
used to detect if the processor is vulnerable.

Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <91cec885656ca1fcd4f0185ce403a53dd9edecb7.1675956146.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index f3cb8c8bf8d9c01c10730a763221b93f6f01ff14..e31c7e75d6b026cbfa3e181582fea25e1e58cbea 100644 (file)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -452,5 +452,6 @@
 #define X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN           X86_BUG(26) /* CPU is too old and its MMIO Stale Data status is unknown */
 #define X86_BUG_RETBLEED               X86_BUG(27) /* CPU is affected by RETBleed */
 #define X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB            X86_BUG(28) /* EIBRS is vulnerable to Post Barrier RSB Predictions */
+#define X86_BUG_SMT_RSB                        X86_BUG(29) /* CPU is vulnerable to Cross-Thread Return Address Predictions */
 
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index 9c1df6222df922e6603e967e9c0c4bd9451f7d9e..1698470dbea5f4637559446f641f87e2e093e22d 100644 (file)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -1125,6 +1125,8 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = {
 #define MMIO_SBDS      BIT(2)
 /* CPU is affected by RETbleed, speculating where you would not expect it */
 #define RETBLEED       BIT(3)
+/* CPU is affected by SMT (cross-thread) return predictions */
+#define SMT_RSB                BIT(4)
 
 static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = {
        VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(IVYBRIDGE,       X86_STEPPING_ANY,               SRBDS),
@@ -1156,8 +1158,8 @@ static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = {
 
        VULNBL_AMD(0x15, RETBLEED),
        VULNBL_AMD(0x16, RETBLEED),
-       VULNBL_AMD(0x17, RETBLEED),
-       VULNBL_HYGON(0x18, RETBLEED),
+       VULNBL_AMD(0x17, RETBLEED | SMT_RSB),
+       VULNBL_HYGON(0x18, RETBLEED | SMT_RSB),
        {}
 };
 
@@ -1275,6 +1277,9 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
            !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO))
                setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB);
 
+       if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, SMT_RSB))
+               setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SMT_RSB);
+
        if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN))
                return;