following people have contributed patches (autogenerated list):
admorgan <admorgan@morgancomputers.net>
+Alexander <aleksandr.rvachev@eltex-co.ru>
Alex Richman <alex@richman.io>
amosonn <amosonn@gmail.com>
Anatol Pomozov <anatol.pomozov@gmail.com>
Ikey Doherty <michael.i.doherty@intel.com>
itsdeepak <deepak.sn@samsung.com>
Jan Blumschein <jan@jan-blumschein.de>
+Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Jay Hankins <jay-hankins@users.noreply.github.com>
Joachim Schiele <joachim.schiele@daimler.com>
Joachim Schiele <js@lastlog.de>
Richard W.M. Jones <rjones@redhat.com>
Riku Voipio <riku.voipio@linaro.org>
Roland Bauerschmidt <rb@debian.org>
+Rostislav <rostislav@users.noreply.github.com>
+Rostislav Skudnov <rostislav@tuxera.com>
Sam Stuewe <halosghost@archlinux.info>
Sangwoo Moon <swmoon00@gmail.com>
Sebastian Pipping <sebastian@pipping.org>
-Unreleased Changes
-==================
+libfuse 3.2.5 (2018-07-24)
+==========================
+* SECURITY UPDATE: In previous versions of libfuse it was possible to
+ for unprivileged users to specify the `allow_other` option even when
+ this was forbidden in `/etc/fuse.conf`. The vulnerability is
+ present only on systems where SELinux is active (including in
+ permissive mode).
* The fusermount binary has been hardened in several ways to reduce
potential attack surface. Most importantly, mountpoints and mount
options must now match a hard-coded whitelist. It is expected that
-project('libfuse3', 'c', version: '3.2.4',
+project('libfuse3', 'c', version: '3.2.5',
meson_version: '>= 0.38',
default_options: [ 'buildtype=debugoptimized' ])