Once all I/O using a blk_crypto_key has completed, filesystems can call
blk_crypto_evict_key(). However, the block layer currently doesn't call
blk_crypto_put_keyslot() until the request is being freed, which happens
after upper layers have been told (via bio_endio()) the I/O has
completed. This causes a race condition where blk_crypto_evict_key()
can see 'slot_refs != 0' without there being an actual bug.
This makes __blk_crypto_evict_key() hit the
'WARN_ON_ONCE(atomic_read(&slot->slot_refs) != 0)' and return without
doing anything, eventually causing a use-after-free in
blk_crypto_reprogram_all_keys(). (This is a very rare bug and has only
been seen when per-file keys are being used with fscrypt.)
There are two options to fix this: either release the keyslot before
bio_endio() is called on the request's last bio, or make
__blk_crypto_evict_key() ignore slot_refs. Let's go with the first
solution, since it preserves the ability to report bugs (via
WARN_ON_ONCE) where a key is evicted while still in-use.
Fixes: a892c8d52c02 ("block: Inline encryption support for blk-mq")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Nathan Huckleberry <nhuck@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230315183907.53675-2-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
return rq->crypt_ctx;
}
+static inline bool blk_crypto_rq_has_keyslot(struct request *rq)
+{
+ return rq->crypt_keyslot;
+}
+
blk_status_t blk_crypto_get_keyslot(struct blk_crypto_profile *profile,
const struct blk_crypto_key *key,
struct blk_crypto_keyslot **slot_ptr);
return false;
}
+static inline bool blk_crypto_rq_has_keyslot(struct request *rq)
+{
+ return false;
+}
+
#endif /* CONFIG_BLK_INLINE_ENCRYPTION */
void __bio_crypt_advance(struct bio *bio, unsigned int bytes);
return true;
}
-blk_status_t __blk_crypto_init_request(struct request *rq);
-static inline blk_status_t blk_crypto_init_request(struct request *rq)
+blk_status_t __blk_crypto_rq_get_keyslot(struct request *rq);
+static inline blk_status_t blk_crypto_rq_get_keyslot(struct request *rq)
{
if (blk_crypto_rq_is_encrypted(rq))
- return __blk_crypto_init_request(rq);
+ return __blk_crypto_rq_get_keyslot(rq);
return BLK_STS_OK;
}
+void __blk_crypto_rq_put_keyslot(struct request *rq);
+static inline void blk_crypto_rq_put_keyslot(struct request *rq)
+{
+ if (blk_crypto_rq_has_keyslot(rq))
+ __blk_crypto_rq_put_keyslot(rq);
+}
+
void __blk_crypto_free_request(struct request *rq);
static inline void blk_crypto_free_request(struct request *rq)
{
{
if (blk_crypto_rq_is_encrypted(rq))
- return blk_crypto_init_request(rq);
+ return blk_crypto_rq_get_keyslot(rq);
return BLK_STS_OK;
}
return true;
}
-blk_status_t __blk_crypto_init_request(struct request *rq)
+blk_status_t __blk_crypto_rq_get_keyslot(struct request *rq)
{
return blk_crypto_get_keyslot(rq->q->crypto_profile,
rq->crypt_ctx->bc_key,
&rq->crypt_keyslot);
}
-/**
- * __blk_crypto_free_request - Uninitialize the crypto fields of a request.
- *
- * @rq: The request whose crypto fields to uninitialize.
- *
- * Completely uninitializes the crypto fields of a request. If a keyslot has
- * been programmed into some inline encryption hardware, that keyslot is
- * released. The rq->crypt_ctx is also freed.
- */
-void __blk_crypto_free_request(struct request *rq)
+void __blk_crypto_rq_put_keyslot(struct request *rq)
{
blk_crypto_put_keyslot(rq->crypt_keyslot);
+ rq->crypt_keyslot = NULL;
+}
+
+void __blk_crypto_free_request(struct request *rq)
+{
+ /* The keyslot, if one was needed, should have been released earlier. */
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(rq->crypt_keyslot))
+ __blk_crypto_rq_put_keyslot(rq);
+
mempool_free(rq->crypt_ctx, bio_crypt_ctx_pool);
- blk_crypto_rq_set_defaults(rq);
+ rq->crypt_ctx = NULL;
}
/**
if (!blk_discard_mergable(req))
elv_merge_requests(q, req, next);
+ blk_crypto_rq_put_keyslot(next);
+
/*
* 'next' is going away, so update stats accordingly
*/
req->q->integrity.profile->complete_fn(req, total_bytes);
#endif
+ /*
+ * Upper layers may call blk_crypto_evict_key() anytime after the last
+ * bio_endio(). Therefore, the keyslot must be released before that.
+ */
+ blk_crypto_rq_put_keyslot(req);
+
blk_account_io_completion(req, total_bytes);
do {
req->q->integrity.profile->complete_fn(req, nr_bytes);
#endif
+ /*
+ * Upper layers may call blk_crypto_evict_key() anytime after the last
+ * bio_endio(). Therefore, the keyslot must be released before that.
+ */
+ if (blk_crypto_rq_has_keyslot(req) && nr_bytes >= blk_rq_bytes(req))
+ __blk_crypto_rq_put_keyslot(req);
+
if (unlikely(error && !blk_rq_is_passthrough(req) &&
!(req->rq_flags & RQF_QUIET)) &&
!test_bit(GD_DEAD, &req->q->disk->state)) {
blk_mq_bio_to_request(rq, bio, nr_segs);
- ret = blk_crypto_init_request(rq);
+ ret = blk_crypto_rq_get_keyslot(rq);
if (ret != BLK_STS_OK) {
bio->bi_status = ret;
bio_endio(bio);