KEYS: x509: remove never-set ->unsupported_key flag
authorEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Wed, 19 Jan 2022 00:54:35 +0000 (16:54 -0800)
committerJarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Tue, 8 Mar 2022 08:33:18 +0000 (10:33 +0200)
The X.509 parser always sets cert->pub->pkey_algo on success, since
x509_extract_key_data() is a mandatory action in the X.509 ASN.1
grammar, and it returns an error if the algorithm is unknown.  Thus,
remove the dead code which handled this field being NULL.  This results
in the ->unsupported_key flag never being set, so remove that too.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c

index 0b4d07aa88111e332d16faeb2f97d8b594585741..d37b187faf9ae8a1226d023c65dbe73dd965c82e 100644 (file)
@@ -226,9 +226,6 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
                        return 0;
                }
 
-               if (x509->unsupported_key)
-                       goto unsupported_crypto_in_x509;
-
                pr_debug("- issuer %s\n", x509->issuer);
                sig = x509->sig;
                if (sig->auth_ids[0])
@@ -245,7 +242,7 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
                         * authority.
                         */
                        if (x509->unsupported_sig)
-                               goto unsupported_crypto_in_x509;
+                               goto unsupported_sig_in_x509;
                        x509->signer = x509;
                        pr_debug("- self-signed\n");
                        return 0;
@@ -309,7 +306,7 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
                might_sleep();
        }
 
-unsupported_crypto_in_x509:
+unsupported_sig_in_x509:
        /* Just prune the certificate chain at this point if we lack some
         * crypto module to go further.  Note, however, we don't want to set
         * sinfo->unsupported_crypto as the signed info block may still be
index c233f136fb354db9987bf72fcba9b6560b6b30bf..da854c94f1115e4d62f001364a8b05f4628bd419 100644 (file)
@@ -36,7 +36,6 @@ struct x509_certificate {
        bool            seen;                   /* Infinite recursion prevention */
        bool            verified;
        bool            self_signed;            /* T if self-signed (check unsupported_sig too) */
-       bool            unsupported_key;        /* T if key uses unsupported crypto */
        bool            unsupported_sig;        /* T if signature uses unsupported crypto */
        bool            blacklisted;
 };
index fe14cae115b51bd03853cfcea3ac2e14cf05d871..b03d04d78eb9d13212cb6b0bfe9516b9869d3e45 100644 (file)
@@ -33,9 +33,6 @@ int x509_get_sig_params(struct x509_certificate *cert)
        sig->data = cert->tbs;
        sig->data_size = cert->tbs_size;
 
-       if (!cert->pub->pkey_algo)
-               cert->unsupported_key = true;
-
        if (!sig->pkey_algo)
                cert->unsupported_sig = true;
 
@@ -173,12 +170,6 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 
        pr_devel("Cert Issuer: %s\n", cert->issuer);
        pr_devel("Cert Subject: %s\n", cert->subject);
-
-       if (cert->unsupported_key) {
-               ret = -ENOPKG;
-               goto error_free_cert;
-       }
-
        pr_devel("Cert Key Algo: %s\n", cert->pub->pkey_algo);
        pr_devel("Cert Valid period: %lld-%lld\n", cert->valid_from, cert->valid_to);