static void __kprobes arch_prepare_ss_slot(struct kprobe *p)
{
kprobe_opcode_t *addr = p->ainsn.api.insn;
- void *addrs[] = {addr, addr + 1};
- u32 insns[] = {p->opcode, BRK64_OPCODE_KPROBES_SS};
- /* prepare insn slot */
- aarch64_insn_patch_text(addrs, insns, 2);
-
- flush_icache_range((uintptr_t)addr, (uintptr_t)(addr + MAX_INSN_SIZE));
+ /*
+ * Prepare insn slot, Mark Rutland points out it depends on a coupe of
+ * subtleties:
+ *
+ * - That the I-cache maintenance for these instructions is complete
+ * *before* the kprobe BRK is written (and aarch64_insn_patch_text_nosync()
+ * ensures this, but just omits causing a Context-Synchronization-Event
+ * on all CPUS).
+ *
+ * - That the kprobe BRK results in an exception (and consequently a
+ * Context-Synchronoization-Event), which ensures that the CPU will
+ * fetch thesingle-step slot instructions *after* this, ensuring that
+ * the new instructions are used
+ *
+ * It supposes to place ISB after patching to guarantee I-cache maintenance
+ * is observed on all CPUS, however, single-step slot is installed in
+ * the BRK exception handler, so it is unnecessary to generate
+ * Contex-Synchronization-Event via ISB again.
+ */
+ aarch64_insn_patch_text_nosync(addr, p->opcode);
+ aarch64_insn_patch_text_nosync(addr + 1, BRK64_OPCODE_KPROBES_SS);
/*
* Needs restoring of return address after stepping xol.