hw/cxl: Check enough data in cmd_firmware_update_transfer()
authorJonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
Fri, 1 Nov 2024 13:39:11 +0000 (13:39 +0000)
committerMichael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Mon, 4 Nov 2024 21:03:25 +0000 (16:03 -0500)
Buggy guest can write a message that advertises more data that
is provided. As QEMU internally duplicates the reported message
size, this may result in an out of bounds access.
Add sanity checks on the size to avoid this.

Reported-by: Esifiel <esifiel@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
Message-Id: <20241101133917.27634-5-Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
hw/cxl/cxl-mailbox-utils.c

index 3cb499a24fd35dd0923576777eca2eb96f6f0c78..27fadc4fa81a90358d5547eccc64e55e31599561 100644 (file)
@@ -705,6 +705,10 @@ static CXLRetCode cmd_firmware_update_transfer(const struct cxl_cmd *cmd,
     } QEMU_PACKED *fw_transfer = (void *)payload_in;
     size_t offset, length;
 
+    if (len < sizeof(*fw_transfer)) {
+        return CXL_MBOX_INVALID_PAYLOAD_LENGTH;
+    }
+
     if (fw_transfer->action == CXL_FW_XFER_ACTION_ABORT) {
         /*
          * At this point there aren't any on-going transfers