There are a few places where we test the current process' capability set
to decide if we're going to be more or less generous with resource
acquisition for a system call. If the process doesn't have the
capability, we can continue the call, albeit in a degraded mode.
These are /not/ the actual security decisions, so it's not proper to use
capable(), which (in certain selinux setups) causes audit messages to
get logged. Switch them to has_capability_noaudit.
Fixes: 7317a03df703f ("xfs: refactor inode ownership change transaction/inode/quota allocation idiom")
Fixes: ea9a46e1c4925 ("xfs: only return detailed fsmap info if the caller has CAP_SYS_ADMIN")
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Reviewed-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
!xfs_getfsmap_is_valid_device(mp, &head->fmh_keys[1]))
return -EINVAL;
- use_rmap = capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) &&
- xfs_has_rmapbt(mp);
+ use_rmap = xfs_has_rmapbt(mp) &&
+ has_capability_noaudit(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
head->fmh_entries = 0;
/* Set up our device handlers. */
goto out_error;
error = xfs_trans_alloc_ichange(ip, NULL, NULL, pdqp,
- capable(CAP_FOWNER), &tp);
+ has_capability_noaudit(current, CAP_FOWNER), &tp);
if (error)
goto out_error;
}
error = xfs_trans_alloc_ichange(ip, udqp, gdqp, NULL,
- capable(CAP_FOWNER), &tp);
+ has_capability_noaudit(current, CAP_FOWNER), &tp);
if (error)
goto out_dqrele;
{
return has_ns_capability_noaudit(t, &init_user_ns, cap);
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(has_capability_noaudit);
static bool ns_capable_common(struct user_namespace *ns,
int cap,