From: Jacob Keller Date: Wed, 22 Feb 2023 17:09:20 +0000 (-0800) Subject: ice: call ice_is_malicious_vf() from ice_vc_process_vf_msg() X-Git-Url: http://git.maquefel.me/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=be96815c616822d3800405b8fbebe3e069d6eed2;p=linux.git ice: call ice_is_malicious_vf() from ice_vc_process_vf_msg() The main loop in __ice_clean_ctrlq first checks if a VF might be malicious before calling ice_vc_process_vf_msg(). This results in duplicate code in both functions to obtain a reference to the VF, and exports the ice_is_malicious_vf() from ice_virtchnl.c unnecessarily. Refactor ice_is_malicious_vf() to be a static function that takes a pointer to the VF. Call this in ice_vc_process_vf_msg() just after we obtain a reference to the VF by calling ice_get_vf_by_id. Pass the mailbox data from the __ice_clean_ctrlq function into ice_vc_process_vf_msg() instead of calling ice_is_malicious_vf(). This reduces the number of exported functions and avoids the need to obtain the VF reference twice for every mailbox message. Note that the state check for ICE_VF_STATE_DIS is kept in ice_is_malicious_vf() and we call this before checking that state in ice_vc_process_vf_msg. This is intentional, as we stop responding to VF messages from a VF once we detect that it may be overflowing the mailbox. This ensures that we continue to silently ignore the message as before without responding via ice_vc_send_msg_to_vf(). Signed-off-by: Jacob Keller Reviewed-by: Michal Swiatkowski Tested-by: Marek Szlosek Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen --- diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_main.c index a7e7a186009e1..20b3f3e6eda1c 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_main.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_main.c @@ -1517,8 +1517,7 @@ static int __ice_clean_ctrlq(struct ice_pf *pf, enum ice_ctl_q q_type) data.max_num_msgs_mbx = hw->mailboxq.num_rq_entries; data.async_watermark_val = ICE_MBX_OVERFLOW_WATERMARK; - if (!ice_is_malicious_vf(pf, &event, &data)) - ice_vc_process_vf_msg(pf, &event); + ice_vc_process_vf_msg(pf, &event, &data); break; case ice_aqc_opc_fw_logging: ice_output_fw_log(hw, &event.desc, event.msg_buf); diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl.c index e0c573d9d1b9b..97243c616d5d6 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl.c @@ -3834,27 +3834,26 @@ void ice_virtchnl_set_repr_ops(struct ice_vf *vf) } /** - * ice_is_malicious_vf - helper function to detect a malicious VF - * @pf: ptr to struct ice_pf - * @event: pointer to the AQ event + * ice_is_malicious_vf - check if this vf might be overflowing mailbox + * @vf: the VF to check * @mbxdata: data about the state of the mailbox + * + * Detect if a given VF might be malicious and attempting to overflow the PF + * mailbox. If so, log a warning message and ignore this event. */ -bool -ice_is_malicious_vf(struct ice_pf *pf, struct ice_rq_event_info *event, - struct ice_mbx_data *mbxdata) +static bool +ice_is_malicious_vf(struct ice_vf *vf, struct ice_mbx_data *mbxdata) { - s16 vf_id = le16_to_cpu(event->desc.retval); - struct device *dev = ice_pf_to_dev(pf); bool report_malvf = false; - struct ice_vf *vf; + struct device *dev; + struct ice_pf *pf; int status; - vf = ice_get_vf_by_id(pf, vf_id); - if (!vf) - return false; + pf = vf->pf; + dev = ice_pf_to_dev(pf); if (test_bit(ICE_VF_STATE_DIS, vf->vf_states)) - goto out_put_vf; + return vf->mbx_info.malicious; /* check to see if we have a newly malicious VF */ status = ice_mbx_vf_state_handler(&pf->hw, mbxdata, &vf->mbx_info, @@ -3872,9 +3871,6 @@ ice_is_malicious_vf(struct ice_pf *pf, struct ice_rq_event_info *event, pf_vsi ? pf_vsi->netdev->dev_addr : zero_addr); } -out_put_vf: - ice_put_vf(vf); - return vf->mbx_info.malicious; } @@ -3882,11 +3878,13 @@ out_put_vf: * ice_vc_process_vf_msg - Process request from VF * @pf: pointer to the PF structure * @event: pointer to the AQ event + * @mbxdata: information used to detect VF attempting mailbox overflow * * called from the common asq/arq handler to * process request from VF */ -void ice_vc_process_vf_msg(struct ice_pf *pf, struct ice_rq_event_info *event) +void ice_vc_process_vf_msg(struct ice_pf *pf, struct ice_rq_event_info *event, + struct ice_mbx_data *mbxdata) { u32 v_opcode = le32_to_cpu(event->desc.cookie_high); s16 vf_id = le16_to_cpu(event->desc.retval); @@ -3908,6 +3906,10 @@ void ice_vc_process_vf_msg(struct ice_pf *pf, struct ice_rq_event_info *event) mutex_lock(&vf->cfg_lock); + /* Check if the VF is trying to overflow the mailbox */ + if (ice_is_malicious_vf(vf, mbxdata)) + goto finish; + /* Check if VF is disabled. */ if (test_bit(ICE_VF_STATE_DIS, vf->vf_states)) { err = -EPERM; diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl.h b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl.h index 648a383fad853..cd747718de738 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl.h +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl.h @@ -63,10 +63,8 @@ int ice_vc_send_msg_to_vf(struct ice_vf *vf, u32 v_opcode, enum virtchnl_status_code v_retval, u8 *msg, u16 msglen); bool ice_vc_isvalid_vsi_id(struct ice_vf *vf, u16 vsi_id); -bool -ice_is_malicious_vf(struct ice_pf *pf, struct ice_rq_event_info *event, - struct ice_mbx_data *mbxdata); -void ice_vc_process_vf_msg(struct ice_pf *pf, struct ice_rq_event_info *event); +void ice_vc_process_vf_msg(struct ice_pf *pf, struct ice_rq_event_info *event, + struct ice_mbx_data *mbxdata); #else /* CONFIG_PCI_IOV */ static inline void ice_virtchnl_set_dflt_ops(struct ice_vf *vf) { } static inline void ice_virtchnl_set_repr_ops(struct ice_vf *vf) { } @@ -86,16 +84,9 @@ static inline bool ice_vc_isvalid_vsi_id(struct ice_vf *vf, u16 vsi_id) return false; } -static inline bool -ice_is_malicious_vf(struct ice_pf __always_unused *pf, - struct ice_rq_event_info __always_unused *event, - struct ice_mbx_data *mbxdata) -{ - return false; -} - static inline void -ice_vc_process_vf_msg(struct ice_pf *pf, struct ice_rq_event_info *event) +ice_vc_process_vf_msg(struct ice_pf *pf, struct ice_rq_event_info *event, + struct ice_mbx_data *mbxdata) { } #endif /* !CONFIG_PCI_IOV */