Rick Edgecombe [Tue, 13 Jun 2023 00:10:55 +0000 (17:10 -0700)]
x86/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack
When a process is duplicated, but the child shares the address space with
the parent, there is potential for the threads sharing a single stack to
cause conflicts for each other. In the normal non-CET case this is handled
in two ways.
With regular CLONE_VM a new stack is provided by userspace such that the
parent and child have different stacks.
For vfork, the parent is suspended until the child exits. So as long as
the child doesn't return from the vfork()/CLONE_VFORK calling function and
sticks to a limited set of operations, the parent and child can share the
same stack.
For shadow stack, these scenarios present similar sharing problems. For the
CLONE_VM case, the child and the parent must have separate shadow stacks.
Instead of changing clone to take a shadow stack, have the kernel just
allocate one and switch to it.
Use stack_size passed from clone3() syscall for thread shadow stack size. A
compat-mode thread shadow stack size is further reduced to 1/4. This
allows more threads to run in a 32-bit address space. The clone() does not
pass stack_size, which was added to clone3(). In that case, use
RLIMIT_STACK size and cap to 4 GB.
For shadow stack enabled vfork(), the parent and child can share the same
shadow stack, like they can share a normal stack. Since the parent is
suspended until the child terminates, the child will not interfere with
the parent while executing as long as it doesn't return from the vfork()
and overwrite up the shadow stack. The child can safely overwrite down
the shadow stack, as the parent can just overwrite this later. So CET does
not add any additional limitations for vfork().
Free the shadow stack on thread exit by doing it in mm_release(). Skip
this when exiting a vfork() child since the stack is shared in the
parent.
During this operation, the shadow stack pointer of the new thread needs
to be updated to point to the newly allocated shadow stack. Since the
ability to do this is confined to the FPU subsystem, change
fpu_clone() to take the new shadow stack pointer, and update it
internally inside the FPU subsystem. This part was suggested by Thomas
Gleixner.
Co-developed-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>
Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230613001108.3040476-30-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com
Rick Edgecombe [Tue, 13 Jun 2023 00:10:54 +0000 (17:10 -0700)]
x86/shstk: Add user-mode shadow stack support
Introduce basic shadow stack enabling/disabling/allocation routines.
A task's shadow stack is allocated from memory with VM_SHADOW_STACK flag
and has a fixed size of min(RLIMIT_STACK, 4GB).
Keep the task's shadow stack address and size in thread_struct. This will
be copied when cloning new threads, but needs to be cleared during exec,
so add a function to do this.
32 bit shadow stack is not expected to have many users and it will
complicate the signal implementation. So do not support IA32 emulation
or x32.
Co-developed-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>
Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230613001108.3040476-29-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com
Rick Edgecombe [Tue, 13 Jun 2023 00:10:53 +0000 (17:10 -0700)]
x86/shstk: Add user control-protection fault handler
A control-protection fault is triggered when a control-flow transfer
attempt violates Shadow Stack or Indirect Branch Tracking constraints.
For example, the return address for a RET instruction differs from the copy
on the shadow stack.
There already exists a control-protection fault handler for handling kernel
IBT faults. Refactor this fault handler into separate user and kernel
handlers, like the page fault handler. Add a control-protection handler
for usermode. To avoid ifdeffery, put them both in a new file cet.c, which
is compiled in the case of either of the two CET features supported in the
kernel: kernel IBT or user mode shadow stack. Move some static inline
functions from traps.c into a header so they can be used in cet.c.
Opportunistically fix a comment in the kernel IBT part of the fault
handler that is on the end of the line instead of preceding it.
Keep the same behavior for the kernel side of the fault handler, except for
converting a BUG to a WARN in the case of a #CP happening when the feature
is missing. This unifies the behavior with the new shadow stack code, and
also prevents the kernel from crashing under this situation which is
potentially recoverable.
The control-protection fault handler works in a similar way as the general
protection fault handler. It provides the si_code SEGV_CPERR to the signal
handler.
Co-developed-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>
Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230613001108.3040476-28-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com
Rick Edgecombe [Tue, 13 Jun 2023 00:10:52 +0000 (17:10 -0700)]
x86: Introduce userspace API for shadow stack
Add three new arch_prctl() handles:
- ARCH_SHSTK_ENABLE/DISABLE enables or disables the specified
feature. Returns 0 on success or a negative value on error.
- ARCH_SHSTK_LOCK prevents future disabling or enabling of the
specified feature. Returns 0 on success or a negative value
on error.
The features are handled per-thread and inherited over fork(2)/clone(2),
but reset on exec().
Co-developed-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>
Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230613001108.3040476-27-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com
Rick Edgecombe [Tue, 13 Jun 2023 00:10:51 +0000 (17:10 -0700)]
x86/fpu: Add helper for modifying xstate
Just like user xfeatures, supervisor xfeatures can be active in the
registers or present in the task FPU buffer. If the registers are
active, the registers can be modified directly. If the registers are
not active, the modification must be performed on the task FPU buffer.
When the state is not active, the kernel could perform modifications
directly to the buffer. But in order for it to do that, it needs
to know where in the buffer the specific state it wants to modify is
located. Doing this is not robust against optimizations that compact
the FPU buffer, as each access would require computing where in the
buffer it is.
The easiest way to modify supervisor xfeature data is to force restore
the registers and write directly to the MSRs. Often times this is just fine
anyway as the registers need to be restored before returning to userspace.
Do this for now, leaving buffer writing optimizations for the future.
Add a new function fpregs_lock_and_load() that can simultaneously call
fpregs_lock() and do this restore. Also perform some extra sanity
checks in this function since this will be used in non-fpu focused code.
Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>
Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230613001108.3040476-26-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com
Rick Edgecombe [Tue, 13 Jun 2023 00:10:50 +0000 (17:10 -0700)]
x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states
Shadow stack register state can be managed with XSAVE. The registers
can logically be separated into two groups:
* Registers controlling user-mode operation
* Registers controlling kernel-mode operation
The architecture has two new XSAVE state components: one for each group
of those groups of registers. This lets an OS manage them separately if
it chooses. Future patches for host userspace and KVM guests will only
utilize the user-mode registers, so only configure XSAVE to save
user-mode registers. This state will add 16 bytes to the xsave buffer
size.
Future patches will use the user-mode XSAVE area to save guest user-mode
CET state. However, VMCS includes new fields for guest CET supervisor
states. KVM can use these to save and restore guest supervisor state, so
host supervisor XSAVE support is not required.
Adding this exacerbates the already unwieldy if statement in
check_xstate_against_struct() that handles warning about unimplemented
xfeatures. So refactor these check's by having XCHECK_SZ() set a bool when
it actually check's the xfeature. This ends up exceeding 80 chars, but was
better on balance than other options explored. Pass the bool as pointer to
make it clear that XCHECK_SZ() can change the variable.
While configuring user-mode XSAVE, clarify kernel-mode registers are not
managed by XSAVE by defining the xfeature in
XFEATURE_MASK_SUPERVISOR_UNSUPPORTED, like is done for XFEATURE_MASK_PT.
This serves more of a documentation as code purpose, and functionally,
only enables a few safety checks.
Both XSAVE state components are supervisor states, even the state
controlling user-mode operation. This is a departure from earlier features
like protection keys where the PKRU state is a normal user
(non-supervisor) state. Having the user state be supervisor-managed
ensures there is no direct, unprivileged access to it, making it harder
for an attacker to subvert CET.
To facilitate this privileged access, define the two user-mode CET MSRs,
and the bits defined in those MSRs relevant to future shadow stack
enablement patches.
Co-developed-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>
Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230613001108.3040476-25-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com
Rick Edgecombe [Tue, 13 Jun 2023 00:10:49 +0000 (17:10 -0700)]
Documentation/x86: Add CET shadow stack description
Introduce a new document on Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET).
Co-developed-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>
Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230613001108.3040476-24-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com
Rick Edgecombe [Tue, 13 Jun 2023 00:10:48 +0000 (17:10 -0700)]
mm: Don't allow write GUPs to shadow stack memory
The x86 Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) feature includes a
new type of memory called shadow stack. This shadow stack memory has
some unusual properties, which requires some core mm changes to
function properly.
In userspace, shadow stack memory is writable only in very specific,
controlled ways. However, since userspace can, even in the limited
ways, modify shadow stack contents, the kernel treats it as writable
memory. As a result, without additional work there would remain many
ways for userspace to trigger the kernel to write arbitrary data to
shadow stacks via get_user_pages(, FOLL_WRITE) based operations. To
help userspace protect their shadow stacks, make this a little less
exposed by blocking writable get_user_pages() operations for shadow
stack VMAs.
Still allow FOLL_FORCE to write through shadow stack protections, as it
does for read-only protections. This is required for debugging use
cases.
[ dhansen: fix rebase goof, readd writable_file_mapping_allowed() hunk ]
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>
Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230613001108.3040476-23-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com
Rick Edgecombe [Tue, 13 Jun 2023 00:10:47 +0000 (17:10 -0700)]
x86/mm: Teach pte_mkwrite() about stack memory
If a VMA has the VM_SHADOW_STACK flag, it is shadow stack memory. So
when it is made writable with pte_mkwrite(), it should create shadow
stack memory, not conventionally writable memory. Now that all the places
where shadow stack memory might be created pass a VMA into pte_mkwrite(),
it can know when it should do this.
So make pte_mkwrite() create shadow stack memory when the VMA has the
VM_SHADOW_STACK flag. Do the same thing for pmd_mkwrite().
This requires referencing VM_SHADOW_STACK in these functions, which are
currently defined in pgtable.h, however mm.h (where VM_SHADOW_STACK is
located) can't be pulled in without causing problems for files that
reference pgtable.h. So also move pte/pmd_mkwrite() into pgtable.c, where
they can safely reference VM_SHADOW_STACK.
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com>
Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>
Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230613001108.3040476-22-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com
Rick Edgecombe [Tue, 13 Jun 2023 00:10:46 +0000 (17:10 -0700)]
x86/mm: Introduce MAP_ABOVE4G
The x86 Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) feature includes a new
type of memory called shadow stack. This shadow stack memory has some
unusual properties, which require some core mm changes to function
properly.
One of the properties is that the shadow stack pointer (SSP), which is a
CPU register that points to the shadow stack like the stack pointer points
to the stack, can't be pointing outside of the 32 bit address space when
the CPU is executing in 32 bit mode. It is desirable to prevent executing
in 32 bit mode when shadow stack is enabled because the kernel can't easily
support 32 bit signals.
On x86 it is possible to transition to 32 bit mode without any special
interaction with the kernel, by doing a "far call" to a 32 bit segment.
So the shadow stack implementation can use this address space behavior
as a feature, by enforcing that shadow stack memory is always mapped
outside of the 32 bit address space. This way userspace will trigger a
general protection fault which will in turn trigger a segfault if it
tries to transition to 32 bit mode with shadow stack enabled.
This provides a clean error generating border for the user if they try
attempt to do 32 bit mode shadow stack, rather than leave the kernel in a
half working state for userspace to be surprised by.
So to allow future shadow stack enabling patches to map shadow stacks
out of the 32 bit address space, introduce MAP_ABOVE4G. The behavior
is pretty much like MAP_32BIT, except that it has the opposite address
range. The are a few differences though.
If both MAP_32BIT and MAP_ABOVE4G are provided, the kernel will use the
MAP_ABOVE4G behavior. Like MAP_32BIT, MAP_ABOVE4G is ignored in a 32 bit
syscall.
Since the default search behavior is top down, the normal kaslr base can
be used for MAP_ABOVE4G. This is unlike MAP_32BIT which has to add its
own randomization in the bottom up case.
For MAP_32BIT, only the bottom up search path is used. For MAP_ABOVE4G
both are potentially valid, so both are used. In the bottomup search
path, the default behavior is already consistent with MAP_ABOVE4G since
mmap base should be above 4GB.
Without MAP_ABOVE4G, the shadow stack will already normally be above 4GB.
So without introducing MAP_ABOVE4G, trying to transition to 32 bit mode
with shadow stack enabled would usually segfault anyway. This is already
pretty decent guard rails. But the addition of MAP_ABOVE4G is some small
complexity spent to make it make it more complete.
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>
Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230613001108.3040476-21-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com
Rick Edgecombe [Tue, 13 Jun 2023 00:10:45 +0000 (17:10 -0700)]
mm/mmap: Add shadow stack pages to memory accounting
The x86 Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) feature includes a new
type of memory called shadow stack. This shadow stack memory has some
unusual properties, which requires some core mm changes to function
properly.
Co-developed-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>
Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230613001108.3040476-20-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com
Rick Edgecombe [Tue, 13 Jun 2023 00:10:44 +0000 (17:10 -0700)]
x86/mm: Warn if create Write=0,Dirty=1 with raw prot
When user shadow stack is in use, Write=0,Dirty=1 is treated by the CPU as
shadow stack memory. So for shadow stack memory this bit combination is
valid, but when Dirty=1,Write=1 (conventionally writable) memory is being
write protected, the kernel has been taught to transition the Dirty=1
bit to SavedDirty=1, to avoid inadvertently creating shadow stack
memory. It does this inside pte_wrprotect() because it knows the PTE is
not intended to be a writable shadow stack entry, it is supposed to be
write protected.
However, when a PTE is created by a raw prot using mk_pte(), mk_pte()
can't know whether to adjust Dirty=1 to SavedDirty=1. It can't
distinguish between the caller intending to create a shadow stack PTE or
needing the SavedDirty shift.
The kernel has been updated to not do this, and so Write=0,Dirty=1
memory should only be created by the pte_mkfoo() helpers. Add a warning
to make sure no new mk_pte() start doing this, like, for example,
set_memory_rox() did.
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>
Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230613001108.3040476-19-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com
Rick Edgecombe [Tue, 13 Jun 2023 00:10:43 +0000 (17:10 -0700)]
mm: Warn on shadow stack memory in wrong vma
The x86 Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) feature includes a new
type of memory called shadow stack. This shadow stack memory has some
unusual properties, which requires some core mm changes to function
properly.
One sharp edge is that PTEs that are both Write=0 and Dirty=1 are
treated as shadow by the CPU, but this combination used to be created by
the kernel on x86. Previous patches have changed the kernel to now avoid
creating these PTEs unless they are for shadow stack memory. In case any
missed corners of the kernel are still creating PTEs like this for
non-shadow stack memory, and to catch any re-introductions of the logic,
warn if any shadow stack PTEs (Write=0, Dirty=1) are found in non-shadow
stack VMAs when they are being zapped. This won't catch transient cases
but should have decent coverage.
In order to check if a PTE is shadow stack in core mm code, add two arch
breakouts arch_check_zapped_pte/pmd(). This will allow shadow stack
specific code to be kept in arch/x86.
Only do the check if shadow stack is supported by the CPU and configured
because in rare cases older CPUs may write Dirty=1 to a Write=0 CPU on
older CPUs. This check is handled in pte_shstk()/pmd_shstk().
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>
Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230613001108.3040476-18-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com
Rick Edgecombe [Tue, 13 Jun 2023 00:10:42 +0000 (17:10 -0700)]
mm: Add guard pages around a shadow stack.
The x86 Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) feature includes a new
type of memory called shadow stack. This shadow stack memory has some
unusual properties, which requires some core mm changes to function
properly.
The architecture of shadow stack constrains the ability of userspace to
move the shadow stack pointer (SSP) in order to prevent corrupting or
switching to other shadow stacks. The RSTORSSP instruction can move the
SSP to different shadow stacks, but it requires a specially placed token
in order to do this. However, the architecture does not prevent
incrementing the stack pointer to wander onto an adjacent shadow stack. To
prevent this in software, enforce guard pages at the beginning of shadow
stack VMAs, such that there will always be a gap between adjacent shadow
stacks.
Make the gap big enough so that no userspace SSP changing operations
(besides RSTORSSP), can move the SSP from one stack to the next. The
SSP can be incremented or decremented by CALL, RET and INCSSP. CALL and
RET can move the SSP by a maximum of 8 bytes, at which point the shadow
stack would be accessed.
The INCSSP instruction can also increment the shadow stack pointer. It
is the shadow stack analog of an instruction like:
addq $0x80, %rsp
However, there is one important difference between an ADD on %rsp and
INCSSP. In addition to modifying SSP, INCSSP also reads from the memory
of the first and last elements that were "popped". It can be thought of
as acting like this:
READ_ONCE(ssp); // read+discard top element on stack
ssp += nr_to_pop * 8; // move the shadow stack
READ_ONCE(ssp-8); // read+discard last popped stack element
The maximum distance INCSSP can move the SSP is 2040 bytes, before it
would read the memory. Therefore, a single page gap will be enough to
prevent any operation from shifting the SSP to an adjacent stack, since
it would have to land in the gap at least once, causing a fault.
This could be accomplished by using VM_GROWSDOWN, but this has a
downside. The behavior would allow shadow stacks to grow, which is
unneeded and adds a strange difference to how most regular stacks work.
In the maple tree code, there is some logic for retrying the unmapped
area search if a guard gap is violated. This retry should happen for
shadow stack guard gap violations as well. This logic currently only
checks for VM_GROWSDOWN for start gaps. Since shadow stacks also have
a start gap as well, create an new define VM_STARTGAP_FLAGS to hold
all the VM flag bits that have start gaps, and make mmap use it.
Co-developed-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>
Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230613001108.3040476-17-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com
Rick Edgecombe [Tue, 13 Jun 2023 00:10:41 +0000 (17:10 -0700)]
x86/mm: Check shadow stack page fault errors
The CPU performs "shadow stack accesses" when it expects to encounter
shadow stack mappings. These accesses can be implicit (via CALL/RET
instructions) or explicit (instructions like WRSS).
Shadow stack accesses to shadow-stack mappings can result in faults in
normal, valid operation just like regular accesses to regular mappings.
Shadow stacks need some of the same features like delayed allocation, swap
and copy-on-write. The kernel needs to use faults to implement those
features.
The architecture has concepts of both shadow stack reads and shadow stack
writes. Any shadow stack access to non-shadow stack memory will generate
a fault with the shadow stack error code bit set.
This means that, unlike normal write protection, the fault handler needs
to create a type of memory that can be written to (with instructions that
generate shadow stack writes), even to fulfill a read access. So in the
case of COW memory, the COW needs to take place even with a shadow stack
read. Otherwise the page will be left (shadow stack) writable in
userspace. So to trigger the appropriate behavior, set FAULT_FLAG_WRITE
for shadow stack accesses, even if the access was a shadow stack read.
For the purpose of making this clearer, consider the following example.
If a process has a shadow stack, and forks, the shadow stack PTEs will
become read-only due to COW. If the CPU in one process performs a shadow
stack read access to the shadow stack, for example executing a RET and
causing the CPU to read the shadow stack copy of the return address, then
in order for the fault to be resolved the PTE will need to be set with
shadow stack permissions. But then the memory would be changeable from
userspace (from CALL, RET, WRSS, etc). So this scenario needs to trigger
COW, otherwise the shared page would be changeable from both processes.
Shadow stack accesses can also result in errors, such as when a shadow
stack overflows, or if a shadow stack access occurs to a non-shadow-stack
mapping. Also, generate the errors for invalid shadow stack accesses.
Co-developed-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>
Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230613001108.3040476-16-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com
Yu-cheng Yu [Tue, 13 Jun 2023 00:10:40 +0000 (17:10 -0700)]
mm: Introduce VM_SHADOW_STACK for shadow stack memory
New hardware extensions implement support for shadow stack memory, such
as x86 Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET). Add a new VM flag to
identify these areas, for example, to be used to properly indicate shadow
stack PTEs to the hardware.
Shadow stack VMA creation will be tightly controlled and limited to
anonymous memory to make the implementation simpler and since that is all
that is required. The solution will rely on pte_mkwrite() to create the
shadow stack PTEs, so it will not be required for vm_get_page_prot() to
learn how to create shadow stack memory. For this reason document that
VM_SHADOW_STACK should not be mixed with VM_SHARED.
Co-developed-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>
Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230613001108.3040476-15-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com
Rick Edgecombe [Tue, 13 Jun 2023 00:10:39 +0000 (17:10 -0700)]
x86/mm: Remove _PAGE_DIRTY from kernel RO pages
New processors that support Shadow Stack regard Write=0,Dirty=1 PTEs as
shadow stack pages.
In normal cases, it can be helpful to create Write=1 PTEs as also Dirty=1
if HW dirty tracking is not needed, because if the Dirty bit is not already
set the CPU has to set Dirty=1 when the memory gets written to. This
creates additional work for the CPU. So traditional wisdom was to simply
set the Dirty bit whenever you didn't care about it. However, it was never
really very helpful for read-only kernel memory.
When CR4.CET=1 and IA32_S_CET.SH_STK_EN=1, some instructions can write to
such supervisor memory. The kernel does not set IA32_S_CET.SH_STK_EN, so
avoiding kernel Write=0,Dirty=1 memory is not strictly needed for any
functional reason. But having Write=0,Dirty=1 kernel memory doesn't have
any functional benefit either, so to reduce ambiguity between shadow stack
and regular Write=0 pages, remove Dirty=1 from any kernel Write=0 PTEs.
Co-developed-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>
Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230613001108.3040476-14-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com
Rick Edgecombe [Tue, 13 Jun 2023 00:10:38 +0000 (17:10 -0700)]
x86/mm: Start actually marking _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY
The recently introduced _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY should be used instead of the
HW Dirty bit whenever a PTE is Write=0, in order to not inadvertently
create shadow stack PTEs. Update pte_mk*() helpers to do this, and apply
the same changes to pmd and pud. Since there is no x86 version of
pte_mkwrite() to hold this arch specific logic, create one. Add it to
x86/mm/pgtable.c instead of x86/asm/include/pgtable.h as future patches
will require it to live in pgtable.c and it will make the diff easier
for reviewers.
Since CPUs without shadow stack support could create Write=0,Dirty=1
PTEs, only return true for pte_shstk() if the CPU also supports shadow
stack. This will prevent these HW creates PTEs as showing as true for
pte_write().
For pte_modify() this is a bit trickier. It takes a "raw" pgprot_t which
was not necessarily created with any of the existing PTE bit helpers.
That means that it can return a pte_t with Write=0,Dirty=1, a shadow
stack PTE, when it did not intend to create one.
Modify it to also move _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY. To avoid
creating Write=0,Dirty=1 PTEs, pte_modify() needs to avoid:
1. Marking Write=0 PTEs Dirty=1
2. Marking Dirty=1 PTEs Write=0
The first case cannot happen as the existing behavior of pte_modify() is to
filter out any Dirty bit passed in newprot. Handle the second case by
shifting _PAGE_DIRTY=1 to _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY=1 if the PTE was write
protected by the pte_modify() call. Apply the same changes to pmd_modify().
Co-developed-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>
Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230613001108.3040476-13-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com
Rick Edgecombe [Tue, 13 Jun 2023 00:10:37 +0000 (17:10 -0700)]
x86/mm: Update ptep/pmdp_set_wrprotect() for _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY
When shadow stack is in use, Write=0,Dirty=1 PTE are preserved for
shadow stack. Copy-on-write PTEs then have Write=0,SavedDirty=1.
When a PTE goes from Write=1,Dirty=1 to Write=0,SavedDirty=1, it could
become a transient shadow stack PTE in two cases:
1. Some processors can start a write but end up seeing a Write=0 PTE by
the time they get to the Dirty bit, creating a transient shadow stack
PTE. However, this will not occur on processors supporting shadow
stack, and a TLB flush is not necessary.
2. When _PAGE_DIRTY is replaced with _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY non-atomically, a
transient shadow stack PTE can be created as a result.
Prevent the second case when doing a write protection and Dirty->SavedDirty
shift at the same time with a CMPXCHG loop. The first case
Note, in the PAE case CMPXCHG will need to operate on 8 byte, but
try_cmpxchg() will not use CMPXCHG8B, so it cannot operate on a full PAE
PTE. However the exiting logic is not operating on a full 8 byte region
either, and relies on the fact that the Write bit is in the first 4
bytes when doing the clear_bit(). Since both the Dirty, SavedDirty and
Write bits are in the first 4 bytes, casting to a long will be similar to
the existing behavior which also casts to a long.
Dave Hansen, Jann Horn, Andy Lutomirski, and Peter Zijlstra provided many
insights to the issue. Jann Horn provided the CMPXCHG solution.
Co-developed-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>
Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230613001108.3040476-12-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com
Rick Edgecombe [Tue, 13 Jun 2023 00:10:36 +0000 (17:10 -0700)]
x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY
Some OSes have a greater dependence on software available bits in PTEs than
Linux. That left the hardware architects looking for a way to represent a
new memory type (shadow stack) within the existing bits. They chose to
repurpose a lightly-used state: Write=0,Dirty=1. So in order to support
shadow stack memory, Linux should avoid creating memory with this PTE bit
combination unless it intends for it to be shadow stack.
The reason it's lightly used is that Dirty=1 is normally set by HW
_before_ a write. A write with a Write=0 PTE would typically only generate
a fault, not set Dirty=1. Hardware can (rarely) both set Dirty=1 *and*
generate the fault, resulting in a Write=0,Dirty=1 PTE. Hardware which
supports shadow stacks will no longer exhibit this oddity.
So that leaves Write=0,Dirty=1 PTEs created in software. To avoid
inadvertently created shadow stack memory, in places where Linux normally
creates Write=0,Dirty=1, it can use the software-defined _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY
in place of the hardware _PAGE_DIRTY. In other words, whenever Linux needs
to create Write=0,Dirty=1, it instead creates Write=0,SavedDirty=1 except
for shadow stack, which is Write=0,Dirty=1.
There are six bits left available to software in the 64-bit PTE after
consuming a bit for _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY. For 32 bit, the same bit as
_PAGE_BIT_UFFD_WP is used, since user fault fd is not supported on 32
bit. This leaves one unused software bit on 32 bit (_PAGE_BIT_SOFT_DIRTY,
as this is also not supported on 32 bit).
Implement only the infrastructure for _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY. Changes to
actually begin creating _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY PTEs will follow once other
pieces are in place.
Since this SavedDirty shifting is done for all x86 CPUs, this leaves
the possibility for the hardware oddity to still create Write=0,Dirty=1
PTEs in rare cases. Since these CPUs also don't support shadow stack, this
will be harmless as it was before the introduction of SavedDirty.
Implement the shifting logic to be branchless. Embed the logic of whether
to do the shifting (including checking the Write bits) so that it can be
called by future callers that would otherwise need additional branching
logic. This efficiency allows the logic of when to do the shifting to be
centralized, making the code easier to reason about.
Co-developed-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>
Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230613001108.3040476-11-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com
Rick Edgecombe [Tue, 13 Jun 2023 00:10:35 +0000 (17:10 -0700)]
x86/mm: Move pmd_write(), pud_write() up in the file
To prepare the introduction of _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY, move pmd_write() and
pud_write() up in the file, so that they can be used by other
helpers below. No functional changes.
Co-developed-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>
Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230613001108.3040476-10-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com
Rick Edgecombe [Tue, 13 Jun 2023 00:10:34 +0000 (17:10 -0700)]
x86/cpufeatures: Add CPU feature flags for shadow stacks
The Control-Flow Enforcement Technology contains two related features,
one of which is Shadow Stacks. Future patches will utilize this feature
for shadow stack support in KVM, so add a CPU feature flags for Shadow
Stacks (CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=0):ECX[bit 7]).
To protect shadow stack state from malicious modification, the registers
are only accessible in supervisor mode. This implementation
context-switches the registers with XSAVES. Make X86_FEATURE_SHSTK depend
on XSAVES.
The shadow stack feature, enumerated by the CPUID bit described above,
encompasses both supervisor and userspace support for shadow stack. In
near future patches, only userspace shadow stack will be enabled. In
expectation of future supervisor shadow stack support, create a software
CPU capability to enumerate kernel utilization of userspace shadow stack
support. This user shadow stack bit should depend on the HW "shstk"
capability and that logic will be implemented in future patches.
Co-developed-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>
Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230613001108.3040476-9-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com
Rick Edgecombe [Tue, 13 Jun 2023 00:10:33 +0000 (17:10 -0700)]
x86/traps: Move control protection handler to separate file
Today the control protection handler is defined in traps.c and used only
for the kernel IBT feature. To reduce ifdeffery, move it to it's own file.
In future patches, functionality will be added to make this handler also
handle user shadow stack faults. So name the file cet.c.
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>
Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230613001108.3040476-8-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com
Rick Edgecombe [Tue, 13 Jun 2023 00:10:32 +0000 (17:10 -0700)]
x86/shstk: Add Kconfig option for shadow stack
Shadow stack provides protection for applications against function return
address corruption. It is active when the processor supports it, the
kernel has CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK enabled, and the application is built
for the feature. This is only implemented for the 64-bit kernel. When it
is enabled, legacy non-shadow stack applications continue to work, but
without protection.
Since there is another feature that utilizes CET (Kernel IBT) that will
share implementation with shadow stacks, create CONFIG_CET to signify
that at least one CET feature is configured.
Co-developed-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>
Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230613001108.3040476-7-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com
Yu-cheng Yu [Tue, 13 Jun 2023 00:10:31 +0000 (17:10 -0700)]
mm: Move VM_UFFD_MINOR_BIT from 37 to 38
The x86 Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) feature includes a new
type of memory called shadow stack. This shadow stack memory has some
unusual properties, which requires some core mm changes to function
properly.
Future patches will introduce a new VM flag VM_SHADOW_STACK that will be
VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_5. VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_1 through VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_4 are
bits 32-36, and bit 37 is the unrelated VM_UFFD_MINOR_BIT. For the sake
of order, make all VM_HIGH_ARCH_BITs stay together by moving
VM_UFFD_MINOR_BIT from 37 to 38. This will allow VM_SHADOW_STACK to be
introduced as 37.
Co-developed-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Axel Rasmussen <axelrasmussen@google.com>
Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>
Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230613001108.3040476-6-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com
Yu-cheng Yu [Tue, 13 Jun 2023 00:10:30 +0000 (17:10 -0700)]
mm: Re-introduce vm_flags to do_mmap()
There was no more caller passing vm_flags to do_mmap(), and vm_flags was
removed from the function's input by:
commit
45e55300f114 ("mm: remove unnecessary wrapper function do_mmap_pgoff()").
There is a new user now. Shadow stack allocation passes VM_SHADOW_STACK to
do_mmap(). Thus, re-introduce vm_flags to do_mmap().
Co-developed-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>
Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230613001108.3040476-5-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com
Rick Edgecombe [Tue, 13 Jun 2023 00:10:29 +0000 (17:10 -0700)]
mm: Make pte_mkwrite() take a VMA
The x86 Shadow stack feature includes a new type of memory called shadow
stack. This shadow stack memory has some unusual properties, which requires
some core mm changes to function properly.
One of these unusual properties is that shadow stack memory is writable,
but only in limited ways. These limits are applied via a specific PTE
bit combination. Nevertheless, the memory is writable, and core mm code
will need to apply the writable permissions in the typical paths that
call pte_mkwrite(). Future patches will make pte_mkwrite() take a VMA, so
that the x86 implementation of it can know whether to create regular
writable or shadow stack mappings.
But there are a couple of challenges to this. Modifying the signatures of
each arch pte_mkwrite() implementation would be error prone because some
are generated with macros and would need to be re-implemented. Also, some
pte_mkwrite() callers operate on kernel memory without a VMA.
So this can be done in a three step process. First pte_mkwrite() can be
renamed to pte_mkwrite_novma() in each arch, with a generic pte_mkwrite()
added that just calls pte_mkwrite_novma(). Next callers without a VMA can
be moved to pte_mkwrite_novma(). And lastly, pte_mkwrite() and all callers
can be changed to take/pass a VMA.
Previous work pte_mkwrite() renamed pte_mkwrite_novma() and converted
callers that don't have a VMA were to use pte_mkwrite_novma(). So now
change pte_mkwrite() to take a VMA and change the remaining callers to
pass a VMA. Apply the same changes for pmd_mkwrite().
No functional change.
Suggested-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230613001108.3040476-4-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com
Rick Edgecombe [Tue, 13 Jun 2023 00:10:28 +0000 (17:10 -0700)]
mm: Move pte/pmd_mkwrite() callers with no VMA to _novma()
The x86 Shadow stack feature includes a new type of memory called shadow
stack. This shadow stack memory has some unusual properties, which requires
some core mm changes to function properly.
One of these unusual properties is that shadow stack memory is writable,
but only in limited ways. These limits are applied via a specific PTE
bit combination. Nevertheless, the memory is writable, and core mm code
will need to apply the writable permissions in the typical paths that
call pte_mkwrite(). Future patches will make pte_mkwrite() take a VMA, so
that the x86 implementation of it can know whether to create regular
writable or shadow stack mappings.
But there are a couple of challenges to this. Modifying the signatures of
each arch pte_mkwrite() implementation would be error prone because some
are generated with macros and would need to be re-implemented. Also, some
pte_mkwrite() callers operate on kernel memory without a VMA.
So this can be done in a three step process. First pte_mkwrite() can be
renamed to pte_mkwrite_novma() in each arch, with a generic pte_mkwrite()
added that just calls pte_mkwrite_novma(). Next callers without a VMA can
be moved to pte_mkwrite_novma(). And lastly, pte_mkwrite() and all callers
can be changed to take/pass a VMA.
Earlier work did the first step, so next move the callers that don't have
a VMA to pte_mkwrite_novma(). Also do the same for pmd_mkwrite(). This
will be ok for the shadow stack feature, as these callers are on kernel
memory which will not need to be made shadow stack, and the other
architectures only currently support one type of memory in pte_mkwrite()
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230613001108.3040476-3-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com
Rick Edgecombe [Tue, 13 Jun 2023 00:10:27 +0000 (17:10 -0700)]
mm: Rename arch pte_mkwrite()'s to pte_mkwrite_novma()
The x86 Shadow stack feature includes a new type of memory called shadow
stack. This shadow stack memory has some unusual properties, which requires
some core mm changes to function properly.
One of these unusual properties is that shadow stack memory is writable,
but only in limited ways. These limits are applied via a specific PTE
bit combination. Nevertheless, the memory is writable, and core mm code
will need to apply the writable permissions in the typical paths that
call pte_mkwrite(). The goal is to make pte_mkwrite() take a VMA, so
that the x86 implementation of it can know whether to create regular
writable or shadow stack mappings.
But there are a couple of challenges to this. Modifying the signatures of
each arch pte_mkwrite() implementation would be error prone because some
are generated with macros and would need to be re-implemented. Also, some
pte_mkwrite() callers operate on kernel memory without a VMA.
So this can be done in a three step process. First pte_mkwrite() can be
renamed to pte_mkwrite_novma() in each arch, with a generic pte_mkwrite()
added that just calls pte_mkwrite_novma(). Next callers without a VMA can
be moved to pte_mkwrite_novma(). And lastly, pte_mkwrite() and all callers
can be changed to take/pass a VMA.
Start the process by renaming pte_mkwrite() to pte_mkwrite_novma() and
adding the pte_mkwrite() wrapper in linux/pgtable.h. Apply the same
pattern for pmd_mkwrite(). Since not all archs have a pmd_mkwrite_novma(),
create a new arch config HAS_HUGE_PAGE that can be used to tell if
pmd_mkwrite() should be defined. Otherwise in the !HAS_HUGE_PAGE cases the
compiler would not be able to find pmd_mkwrite_novma().
No functional change.
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=wiZjSu7c9sFYZb3q04108stgHff2wfbokGCCgW7riz+8Q@mail.gmail.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230613001108.3040476-2-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com
Linus Torvalds [Sun, 9 Jul 2023 20:53:13 +0000 (13:53 -0700)]
Linux 6.5-rc1
Linus Torvalds [Sun, 9 Jul 2023 17:29:53 +0000 (10:29 -0700)]
MAINTAINERS 2: Electric Boogaloo
We just sorted the entries and fields last release, so just out of a
perverse sense of curiosity, I decided to see if we can keep things
ordered for even just one release.
The answer is "No. No we cannot".
I suggest that all kernel developers will need weekly training sessions,
involving a lot of Big Bird and Sesame Street. And at the yearly
maintainer summit, we will all sing the alphabet song together.
I doubt I will keep doing this. At some point "perverse sense of
curiosity" turns into just a cold dark place filled with sadness and
despair.
Repeats:
80e62bc8487b ("MAINTAINERS: re-sort all entries and fields")
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Linus Torvalds [Sun, 9 Jul 2023 17:24:22 +0000 (10:24 -0700)]
Merge tag 'dma-mapping-6.5-2023-07-09' of git://git.infradead.org/users/hch/dma-mapping
Pull dma-mapping fixes from Christoph Hellwig:
- swiotlb area sizing fixes (Petr Tesarik)
* tag 'dma-mapping-6.5-2023-07-09' of git://git.infradead.org/users/hch/dma-mapping:
swiotlb: reduce the number of areas to match actual memory pool size
swiotlb: always set the number of areas before allocating the pool
Linus Torvalds [Sun, 9 Jul 2023 17:16:04 +0000 (10:16 -0700)]
Merge tag 'irq_urgent_for_v6.5_rc1' of git://git./linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull irq update from Borislav Petkov:
- Optimize IRQ domain's name assignment
* tag 'irq_urgent_for_v6.5_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
irqdomain: Use return value of strreplace()
Linus Torvalds [Sun, 9 Jul 2023 17:13:32 +0000 (10:13 -0700)]
Merge tag 'x86_urgent_for_v6.5_rc1' of git://git./linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 fpu fix from Borislav Petkov:
- Do FPU AP initialization on Xen PV too which got missed by the recent
boot reordering work
* tag 'x86_urgent_for_v6.5_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/xen: Fix secondary processors' FPU initialization
Linus Torvalds [Sun, 9 Jul 2023 17:08:38 +0000 (10:08 -0700)]
Merge tag 'x86-core-2023-07-09' of git://git./linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 fix from Thomas Gleixner:
"A single fix for the mechanism to park CPUs with an INIT IPI.
On shutdown or kexec, the kernel tries to park the non-boot CPUs with
an INIT IPI. But the same code path is also used by the crash utility.
If the CPU which panics is not the boot CPU then it sends an INIT IPI
to the boot CPU which resets the machine.
Prevent this by validating that the CPU which runs the stop mechanism
is the boot CPU. If not, leave the other CPUs in HLT"
* tag 'x86-core-2023-07-09' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/smp: Don't send INIT to boot CPU
Linus Torvalds [Sun, 9 Jul 2023 17:02:49 +0000 (10:02 -0700)]
Merge tag 'mips_6.5_1' of git://git./linux/kernel/git/mips/linux
Pull MIPS fixes from Thomas Bogendoerfer:
- fixes for KVM
- fix for loongson build and cpu probing
- DT fixes
* tag 'mips_6.5_1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mips/linux:
MIPS: kvm: Fix build error with KVM_MIPS_DEBUG_COP0_COUNTERS enabled
MIPS: dts: add missing space before {
MIPS: Loongson: Fix build error when make modules_install
MIPS: KVM: Fix NULL pointer dereference
MIPS: Loongson: Fix cpu_probe_loongson() again
Linus Torvalds [Sun, 9 Jul 2023 16:50:42 +0000 (09:50 -0700)]
Merge tag 'xfs-6.5-merge-6' of git://git./fs/xfs/xfs-linux
Pull xfs fix from Darrick Wong:
"Nothing exciting here, just getting rid of a gcc warning that I got
tired of seeing when I turn on gcov"
* tag 'xfs-6.5-merge-6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/fs/xfs/xfs-linux:
xfs: fix uninit warning in xfs_growfs_data
Linus Torvalds [Sun, 9 Jul 2023 16:45:32 +0000 (09:45 -0700)]
Merge tag '6.5-rc-smb3-client-fixes-part2' of git://git.samba.org/sfrench/cifs-2.6
Pull more smb client updates from Steve French:
- fix potential use after free in unmount
- minor cleanup
- add worker to cleanup stale directory leases
* tag '6.5-rc-smb3-client-fixes-part2' of git://git.samba.org/sfrench/cifs-2.6:
cifs: Add a laundromat thread for cached directories
smb: client: remove redundant pointer 'server'
cifs: fix session state transition to avoid use-after-free issue
Linus Torvalds [Sun, 9 Jul 2023 16:35:51 +0000 (09:35 -0700)]
Merge tag 'ntb-6.5' of https://github.com/jonmason/ntb
Pull NTB updates from Jon Mason:
"Fixes for pci_clean_master, error handling in driver inits, and
various other issues/bugs"
* tag 'ntb-6.5' of https://github.com/jonmason/ntb:
ntb: hw: amd: Fix debugfs_create_dir error checking
ntb.rst: Fix copy and paste error
ntb_netdev: Fix module_init problem
ntb: intel: Remove redundant pci_clear_master
ntb: epf: Remove redundant pci_clear_master
ntb_hw_amd: Remove redundant pci_clear_master
ntb: idt: drop redundant pci_enable_pcie_error_reporting()
MAINTAINERS: git://github -> https://github.com for jonmason
NTB: EPF: fix possible memory leak in pci_vntb_probe()
NTB: ntb_tool: Add check for devm_kcalloc
NTB: ntb_transport: fix possible memory leak while device_register() fails
ntb: intel: Fix error handling in intel_ntb_pci_driver_init()
NTB: amd: Fix error handling in amd_ntb_pci_driver_init()
ntb: idt: Fix error handling in idt_pci_driver_init()
Hugh Dickins [Sat, 8 Jul 2023 23:04:00 +0000 (16:04 -0700)]
mm: lock newly mapped VMA with corrected ordering
Lockdep is certainly right to complain about
(&vma->vm_lock->lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: vma_start_write+0x2d/0x3f
but task is already holding lock:
(&mapping->i_mmap_rwsem){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mmap_region+0x4dc/0x6db
Invert those to the usual ordering.
Fixes: 33313a747e81 ("mm: lock newly mapped VMA which can be modified after it becomes visible")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Tested-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Linus Torvalds [Sat, 8 Jul 2023 21:30:25 +0000 (14:30 -0700)]
Merge tag 'mm-hotfixes-stable-2023-07-08-10-43' of git://git./linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
Pull hotfixes from Andrew Morton:
"16 hotfixes. Six are cc:stable and the remainder address post-6.4
issues"
The merge undoes the disabling of the CONFIG_PER_VMA_LOCK feature, since
it was all hopefully fixed in mainline.
* tag 'mm-hotfixes-stable-2023-07-08-10-43' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm:
lib: dhry: fix sleeping allocations inside non-preemptable section
kasan, slub: fix HW_TAGS zeroing with slub_debug
kasan: fix type cast in memory_is_poisoned_n
mailmap: add entries for Heiko Stuebner
mailmap: update manpage link
bootmem: remove the vmemmap pages from kmemleak in free_bootmem_page
MAINTAINERS: add linux-next info
mailmap: add Markus Schneider-Pargmann
writeback: account the number of pages written back
mm: call arch_swap_restore() from do_swap_page()
squashfs: fix cache race with migration
mm/hugetlb.c: fix a bug within a BUG(): inconsistent pte comparison
docs: update ocfs2-devel mailing list address
MAINTAINERS: update ocfs2-devel mailing list address
mm: disable CONFIG_PER_VMA_LOCK until its fixed
fork: lock VMAs of the parent process when forking
Suren Baghdasaryan [Sat, 8 Jul 2023 19:12:12 +0000 (12:12 -0700)]
fork: lock VMAs of the parent process when forking
When forking a child process, the parent write-protects anonymous pages
and COW-shares them with the child being forked using copy_present_pte().
We must not take any concurrent page faults on the source vma's as they
are being processed, as we expect both the vma and the pte's behind it
to be stable. For example, the anon_vma_fork() expects the parents
vma->anon_vma to not change during the vma copy.
A concurrent page fault on a page newly marked read-only by the page
copy might trigger wp_page_copy() and a anon_vma_prepare(vma) on the
source vma, defeating the anon_vma_clone() that wasn't done because the
parent vma originally didn't have an anon_vma, but we now might end up
copying a pte entry for a page that has one.
Before the per-vma lock based changes, the mmap_lock guaranteed
exclusion with concurrent page faults. But now we need to do a
vma_start_write() to make sure no concurrent faults happen on this vma
while it is being processed.
This fix can potentially regress some fork-heavy workloads. Kernel
build time did not show noticeable regression on a 56-core machine while
a stress test mapping 10000 VMAs and forking 5000 times in a tight loop
shows ~5% regression. If such fork time regression is unacceptable,
disabling CONFIG_PER_VMA_LOCK should restore its performance. Further
optimizations are possible if this regression proves to be problematic.
Suggested-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@kernel.org>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/dbdef34c-3a07-5951-e1ae-e9c6e3cdf51b@kernel.org/
Reported-by: Holger Hoffstätte <holger@applied-asynchrony.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/b198d649-f4bf-b971-31d0-e8433ec2a34c@applied-asynchrony.com/
Reported-by: Jacob Young <jacobly.alt@gmail.com>
Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=217624
Fixes: 0bff0aaea03e ("x86/mm: try VMA lock-based page fault handling first")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Suren Baghdasaryan [Sat, 8 Jul 2023 19:12:11 +0000 (12:12 -0700)]
mm: lock newly mapped VMA which can be modified after it becomes visible
mmap_region adds a newly created VMA into VMA tree and might modify it
afterwards before dropping the mmap_lock. This poses a problem for page
faults handled under per-VMA locks because they don't take the mmap_lock
and can stumble on this VMA while it's still being modified. Currently
this does not pose a problem since post-addition modifications are done
only for file-backed VMAs, which are not handled under per-VMA lock.
However, once support for handling file-backed page faults with per-VMA
locks is added, this will become a race.
Fix this by write-locking the VMA before inserting it into the VMA tree.
Other places where a new VMA is added into VMA tree do not modify it
after the insertion, so do not need the same locking.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Suren Baghdasaryan [Sat, 8 Jul 2023 19:12:10 +0000 (12:12 -0700)]
mm: lock a vma before stack expansion
With recent changes necessitating mmap_lock to be held for write while
expanding a stack, per-VMA locks should follow the same rules and be
write-locked to prevent page faults into the VMA being expanded. Add
the necessary locking.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Linus Torvalds [Sat, 8 Jul 2023 19:35:18 +0000 (12:35 -0700)]
Merge tag 'scsi-misc' of git://git./linux/kernel/git/jejb/scsi
Pull more SCSI updates from James Bottomley:
"A few late arriving patches that missed the initial pull request. It's
mostly bug fixes (the dt-bindings is a fix for the initial pull)"
* tag 'scsi-misc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jejb/scsi:
scsi: ufs: core: Remove unused function declaration
scsi: target: docs: Remove tcm_mod_builder.py
scsi: target: iblock: Quiet bool conversion warning with pr_preempt use
scsi: dt-bindings: ufs: qcom: Fix ICE phandle
scsi: core: Simplify scsi_cdl_check_cmd()
scsi: isci: Fix comment typo
scsi: smartpqi: Replace one-element arrays with flexible-array members
scsi: target: tcmu: Replace strlcpy() with strscpy()
scsi: ncr53c8xx: Replace strlcpy() with strscpy()
scsi: lpfc: Fix lpfc_name struct packing
Linus Torvalds [Sat, 8 Jul 2023 19:28:00 +0000 (12:28 -0700)]
Merge tag 'i2c-for-6.5-rc1-part2' of git://git./linux/kernel/git/wsa/linux
Pull more i2c updates from Wolfram Sang:
- xiic patch should have been in the original pull but slipped through
- mpc patch fixes a build regression
- nomadik cleanup
* tag 'i2c-for-6.5-rc1-part2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/wsa/linux:
i2c: mpc: Drop unused variable
i2c: nomadik: Remove a useless call in the remove function
i2c: xiic: Don't try to handle more interrupt events after error
Linus Torvalds [Sat, 8 Jul 2023 19:08:39 +0000 (12:08 -0700)]
Merge tag 'hardening-v6.5-rc1-fixes' of git://git./linux/kernel/git/kees/linux
Pull hardening fixes from Kees Cook:
- Check for NULL bdev in LoadPin (Matthias Kaehlcke)
- Revert unwanted KUnit FORTIFY build default
- Fix 1-element array causing boot warnings with xhci-hub
* tag 'hardening-v6.5-rc1-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
usb: ch9: Replace bmSublinkSpeedAttr 1-element array with flexible array
Revert "fortify: Allow KUnit test to build without FORTIFY"
dm: verity-loadpin: Add NULL pointer check for 'bdev' parameter
Anup Sharma [Fri, 12 May 2023 20:24:34 +0000 (01:54 +0530)]
ntb: hw: amd: Fix debugfs_create_dir error checking
The debugfs_create_dir function returns ERR_PTR in case of error, and the
only correct way to check if an error occurred is 'IS_ERR' inline function.
This patch will replace the null-comparison with IS_ERR.
Signed-off-by: Anup Sharma <anupnewsmail@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Ivan Orlov <ivan.orlov0322@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Mason <jdmason@kudzu.us>
Linus Torvalds [Sat, 8 Jul 2023 17:21:51 +0000 (10:21 -0700)]
Merge tag 'perf-tools-for-v6.5-2-2023-07-06' of git://git./linux/kernel/git/perf/perf-tools-next
Pull more perf tools updates from Namhyung Kim:
"These are remaining changes and fixes for this cycle.
Build:
- Allow generating vmlinux.h from BTF using `make GEN_VMLINUX_H=1`
and skip if the vmlinux has no BTF.
- Replace deprecated clang -target xxx option by --target=xxx.
perf record:
- Print event attributes with well known type and config symbols in
the debug output like below:
# perf record -e cycles,cpu-clock -C0 -vv true
<SNIP>
------------------------------------------------------------
perf_event_attr:
type 0 (PERF_TYPE_HARDWARE)
size 136
config 0 (PERF_COUNT_HW_CPU_CYCLES)
{ sample_period, sample_freq } 4000
sample_type IP|TID|TIME|CPU|PERIOD|IDENTIFIER
read_format ID
disabled 1
inherit 1
freq 1
sample_id_all 1
exclude_guest 1
------------------------------------------------------------
sys_perf_event_open: pid -1 cpu 0 group_fd -1 flags 0x8 = 5
------------------------------------------------------------
perf_event_attr:
type 1 (PERF_TYPE_SOFTWARE)
size 136
config 0 (PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK)
{ sample_period, sample_freq } 4000
sample_type IP|TID|TIME|CPU|PERIOD|IDENTIFIER
read_format ID
disabled 1
inherit 1
freq 1
sample_id_all 1
exclude_guest 1
- Update AMD IBS event error message since it now support per-process
profiling but no priviledge filters.
$ sudo perf record -e ibs_op//k -C 0
Error:
AMD IBS doesn't support privilege filtering. Try again without
the privilege modifiers (like 'k') at the end.
perf lock contention:
- Support CSV style output using -x option
$ sudo perf lock con -ab -x, sleep 1
# output: contended, total wait, max wait, avg wait, type, caller
19, 194232, 21415, 10222, spinlock, process_one_work+0x1f0
15, 162748, 23843, 10849, rwsem:R, do_user_addr_fault+0x40e
4, 86740, 23415, 21685, rwlock:R, ep_poll_callback+0x2d
1, 84281, 84281, 84281, mutex, iwl_mvm_async_handlers_wk+0x135
8, 67608, 27404, 8451, spinlock, __queue_work+0x174
3, 58616, 31125, 19538, rwsem:W, do_mprotect_pkey+0xff
3, 52953, 21172, 17651, rwlock:W, do_epoll_wait+0x248
2, 30324, 19704, 15162, rwsem:R, do_madvise+0x3ad
1, 24619, 24619, 24619, spinlock, rcu_core+0xd4
- Add --output option to save the data to a file not to be interfered
by other debug messages.
Test:
- Fix event parsing test on ARM where there's no raw PMU nor supports
PERF_PMU_CAP_EXTENDED_HW_TYPE.
- Update the lock contention test case for CSV output.
- Fix a segfault in the daemon command test.
Vendor events (JSON):
- Add has_event() to check if the given event is available on system
at runtime. On Intel machines, some transaction events may not be
present when TSC extensions are disabled.
- Update Intel event metrics.
Misc:
- Sort symbols by name using an external array of pointers instead of
a rbtree node in the symbol. This will save 16-bytes or 24-bytes
per symbol whether the sorting is actually requested or not.
- Fix unwinding DWARF callstacks using libdw when --symfs option is
used"
* tag 'perf-tools-for-v6.5-2-2023-07-06' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/perf/perf-tools-next: (38 commits)
perf test: Fix event parsing test when PERF_PMU_CAP_EXTENDED_HW_TYPE isn't supported.
perf test: Fix event parsing test on Arm
perf evsel amd: Fix IBS error message
perf: unwind: Fix symfs with libdw
perf symbol: Fix uninitialized return value in symbols__find_by_name()
perf test: Test perf lock contention CSV output
perf lock contention: Add --output option
perf lock contention: Add -x option for CSV style output
perf lock: Remove stale comments
perf vendor events intel: Update tigerlake to 1.13
perf vendor events intel: Update skylakex to 1.31
perf vendor events intel: Update skylake to 57
perf vendor events intel: Update sapphirerapids to 1.14
perf vendor events intel: Update icelakex to 1.21
perf vendor events intel: Update icelake to 1.19
perf vendor events intel: Update cascadelakex to 1.19
perf vendor events intel: Update meteorlake to 1.03
perf vendor events intel: Add rocketlake events/metrics
perf vendor metrics intel: Make transaction metrics conditional
perf jevents: Support for has_event function
...
Linus Torvalds [Sat, 8 Jul 2023 17:02:24 +0000 (10:02 -0700)]
Merge tag 'bitmap-6.5-rc1' of https://github.com/norov/linux
Pull bitmap updates from Yury Norov:
"Fixes for different bitmap pieces:
- lib/test_bitmap: increment failure counter properly
The tests that don't use expect_eq() macro to determine that a test
is failured must increment failed_tests explicitly.
- lib/bitmap: drop optimization of bitmap_{from,to}_arr64
bitmap_{from,to}_arr64() optimization is overly optimistic
on 32-bit LE architectures when it's wired to
bitmap_copy_clear_tail().
- nodemask: Drop duplicate check in for_each_node_mask()
As the return value type of first_node() became unsigned, the node
>= 0 became unnecessary.
- cpumask: fix function description kernel-doc notation
- MAINTAINERS: Add bits.h and bitfield.h to the BITMAP API record
Add linux/bits.h and linux/bitfield.h for visibility"
* tag 'bitmap-6.5-rc1' of https://github.com/norov/linux:
MAINTAINERS: Add bitfield.h to the BITMAP API record
MAINTAINERS: Add bits.h to the BITMAP API record
cpumask: fix function description kernel-doc notation
nodemask: Drop duplicate check in for_each_node_mask()
lib/bitmap: drop optimization of bitmap_{from,to}_arr64
lib/test_bitmap: increment failure counter properly
Geert Uytterhoeven [Wed, 5 Jul 2023 14:54:04 +0000 (16:54 +0200)]
lib: dhry: fix sleeping allocations inside non-preemptable section
The Smatch static checker reports the following warnings:
lib/dhry_run.c:38 dhry_benchmark() warn: sleeping in atomic context
lib/dhry_run.c:43 dhry_benchmark() warn: sleeping in atomic context
Indeed, dhry() does sleeping allocations inside the non-preemptable
section delimited by get_cpu()/put_cpu().
Fix this by using atomic allocations instead.
Add error handling, as atomic these allocations may fail.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/bac6d517818a7cd8efe217c1ad649fffab9cc371.1688568764.git.geert+renesas@glider.be
Fixes: 13684e966d46283e ("lib: dhry: fix unstable smp_processor_id(_) usage")
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@linaro.org>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/0469eb3a-02eb-4b41-b189-de20b931fa56@moroto.mountain
Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Andrey Konovalov [Wed, 5 Jul 2023 12:44:02 +0000 (14:44 +0200)]
kasan, slub: fix HW_TAGS zeroing with slub_debug
Commit
946fa0dbf2d8 ("mm/slub: extend redzone check to extra allocated
kmalloc space than requested") added precise kmalloc redzone poisoning to
the slub_debug functionality.
However, this commit didn't account for HW_TAGS KASAN fully initializing
the object via its built-in memory initialization feature. Even though
HW_TAGS KASAN memory initialization contains special memory initialization
handling for when slub_debug is enabled, it does not account for in-object
slub_debug redzones. As a result, HW_TAGS KASAN can overwrite these
redzones and cause false-positive slub_debug reports.
To fix the issue, avoid HW_TAGS KASAN memory initialization when
slub_debug is enabled altogether. Implement this by moving the
__slub_debug_enabled check to slab_post_alloc_hook. Common slab code
seems like a more appropriate place for a slub_debug check anyway.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/678ac92ab790dba9198f9ca14f405651b97c8502.1688561016.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Fixes: 946fa0dbf2d8 ("mm/slub: extend redzone check to extra allocated kmalloc space than requested")
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Reported-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Feng Tang <feng.tang@intel.com>
Cc: Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev>
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Andrey Konovalov [Tue, 4 Jul 2023 00:52:05 +0000 (02:52 +0200)]
kasan: fix type cast in memory_is_poisoned_n
Commit
bb6e04a173f0 ("kasan: use internal prototypes matching gcc-13
builtins") introduced a bug into the memory_is_poisoned_n implementation:
it effectively removed the cast to a signed integer type after applying
KASAN_GRANULE_MASK.
As a result, KASAN started failing to properly check memset, memcpy, and
other similar functions.
Fix the bug by adding the cast back (through an additional signed integer
variable to make the code more readable).
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/8c9e0251c2b8b81016255709d4ec42942dcaf018.1688431866.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Fixes: bb6e04a173f0 ("kasan: use internal prototypes matching gcc-13 builtins")
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Heiko Stuebner [Tue, 4 Jul 2023 16:39:19 +0000 (18:39 +0200)]
mailmap: add entries for Heiko Stuebner
I am going to lose my vrull.eu address at the end of july, and while
adding it to mailmap I also realised that there are more old addresses
from me dangling, so update .mailmap for all of them.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230704163919.1136784-3-heiko@sntech.de
Signed-off-by: Heiko Stuebner <heiko@sntech.de>
Signed-off-by: Heiko Stuebner <heiko.stuebner@vrull.eu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Heiko Stuebner [Tue, 4 Jul 2023 16:39:18 +0000 (18:39 +0200)]
mailmap: update manpage link
Patch series "Update .mailmap for my work address and fix manpage".
While updating mailmap for the going-away address, I also found that on
current systems the manpage linked from the header comment changed.
And in fact it looks like the git mailmap feature got its own manpage.
This patch (of 2):
On recent systems the git-shortlog manpage only tells people to
See gitmailmap(5)
So instead of sending people on a scavenger hunt, put that info into the
header directly. Though keep the old reference around for older systems.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230704163919.1136784-1-heiko@sntech.de
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230704163919.1136784-2-heiko@sntech.de
Signed-off-by: Heiko Stuebner <heiko.stuebner@vrull.eu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Liu Shixin [Tue, 4 Jul 2023 10:19:42 +0000 (18:19 +0800)]
bootmem: remove the vmemmap pages from kmemleak in free_bootmem_page
commit
dd0ff4d12dd2 ("bootmem: remove the vmemmap pages from kmemleak in
put_page_bootmem") fix an overlaps existing problem of kmemleak. But the
problem still existed when HAVE_BOOTMEM_INFO_NODE is disabled, because in
this case, free_bootmem_page() will call free_reserved_page() directly.
Fix the problem by adding kmemleak_free_part() in free_bootmem_page() when
HAVE_BOOTMEM_INFO_NODE is disabled.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230704101942.2819426-1-liushixin2@huawei.com
Fixes: f41f2ed43ca5 ("mm: hugetlb: free the vmemmap pages associated with each HugeTLB page")
Signed-off-by: Liu Shixin <liushixin2@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Muchun Song <songmuchun@bytedance.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Randy Dunlap [Tue, 4 Jul 2023 05:44:10 +0000 (22:44 -0700)]
MAINTAINERS: add linux-next info
Add linux-next info to MAINTAINERS for ease of finding this data.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230704054410.12527-1-rdunlap@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Markus Schneider-Pargmann [Wed, 28 Jun 2023 08:13:41 +0000 (10:13 +0200)]
mailmap: add Markus Schneider-Pargmann
Add my old mail address and update my name.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230628081341.3470229-1-msp@baylibre.com
Signed-off-by: Markus Schneider-Pargmann <msp@baylibre.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) [Wed, 28 Jun 2023 18:55:48 +0000 (19:55 +0100)]
writeback: account the number of pages written back
nr_to_write is a count of pages, so we need to decrease it by the number
of pages in the folio we just wrote, not by 1. Most callers specify
either LONG_MAX or 1, so are unaffected, but writeback_sb_inodes() might
end up writing 512x as many pages as it asked for.
Dave added:
: XFS is the only filesystem this would affect, right? AFAIA, nothing
: else enables large folios and uses writeback through
: write_cache_pages() at this point...
:
: In which case, I'd be surprised if much difference, if any, gets
: noticed by anyone.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230628185548.981888-1-willy@infradead.org
Fixes: 793917d997df ("mm/readahead: Add large folio readahead")
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Peter Collingbourne [Tue, 23 May 2023 00:43:08 +0000 (17:43 -0700)]
mm: call arch_swap_restore() from do_swap_page()
Commit
c145e0b47c77 ("mm: streamline COW logic in do_swap_page()") moved
the call to swap_free() before the call to set_pte_at(), which meant that
the MTE tags could end up being freed before set_pte_at() had a chance to
restore them. Fix it by adding a call to the arch_swap_restore() hook
before the call to swap_free().
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230523004312.1807357-2-pcc@google.com
Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/I6470efa669e8bd2f841049b8c61020c510678965
Fixes: c145e0b47c77 ("mm: streamline COW logic in do_swap_page()")
Signed-off-by: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com>
Reported-by: Qun-wei Lin <Qun-wei.Lin@mediatek.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/5050805753ac469e8d727c797c2218a9d780d434.camel@mediatek.com/
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Acked-by: "Huang, Ying" <ying.huang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com>
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [6.1+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Vincent Whitchurch [Thu, 29 Jun 2023 14:17:57 +0000 (16:17 +0200)]
squashfs: fix cache race with migration
Migration replaces the page in the mapping before copying the contents and
the flags over from the old page, so check that the page in the page cache
is really up to date before using it. Without this, stressing squashfs
reads with parallel compaction sometimes results in squashfs reporting
data corruption.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230629-squashfs-cache-migration-v1-1-d50ebe55099d@axis.com
Fixes: e994f5b677ee ("squashfs: cache partial compressed blocks")
Signed-off-by: Vincent Whitchurch <vincent.whitchurch@axis.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Phillip Lougher <phillip@squashfs.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
John Hubbard [Sat, 1 Jul 2023 01:04:42 +0000 (18:04 -0700)]
mm/hugetlb.c: fix a bug within a BUG(): inconsistent pte comparison
The following crash happens for me when running the -mm selftests (below).
Specifically, it happens while running the uffd-stress subtests:
kernel BUG at mm/hugetlb.c:7249!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
CPU: 0 PID: 3238 Comm: uffd-stress Not tainted 6.4.0-hubbard-github+ #109
Hardware name: ASUS X299-A/PRIME X299-A, BIOS 1503 08/03/2018
RIP: 0010:huge_pte_alloc+0x12c/0x1a0
...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __die_body+0x63/0xb0
? die+0x9f/0xc0
? do_trap+0xab/0x180
? huge_pte_alloc+0x12c/0x1a0
? do_error_trap+0xc6/0x110
? huge_pte_alloc+0x12c/0x1a0
? handle_invalid_op+0x2c/0x40
? huge_pte_alloc+0x12c/0x1a0
? exc_invalid_op+0x33/0x50
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20
? __pfx_put_prev_task_idle+0x10/0x10
? huge_pte_alloc+0x12c/0x1a0
hugetlb_fault+0x1a3/0x1120
? finish_task_switch+0xb3/0x2a0
? lock_is_held_type+0xdb/0x150
handle_mm_fault+0xb8a/0xd40
? find_vma+0x5d/0xa0
do_user_addr_fault+0x257/0x5d0
exc_page_fault+0x7b/0x1f0
asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30
That happens because a BUG() statement in huge_pte_alloc() attempts to
check that a pte, if present, is a hugetlb pte, but it does so in a
non-lockless-safe manner that leads to a false BUG() report.
We got here due to a couple of bugs, each of which by itself was not quite
enough to cause a problem:
First of all, before commit
c33c794828f2("mm: ptep_get() conversion"), the
BUG() statement in huge_pte_alloc() was itself fragile: it relied upon
compiler behavior to only read the pte once, despite using it twice in the
same conditional.
Next, commit
c33c794828f2 ("mm: ptep_get() conversion") broke that
delicate situation, by causing all direct pte reads to be done via
READ_ONCE(). And so READ_ONCE() got called twice within the same BUG()
conditional, leading to comparing (potentially, occasionally) different
versions of the pte, and thus to false BUG() reports.
Fix this by taking a single snapshot of the pte before using it in the
BUG conditional.
Now, that commit is only partially to blame here but, people doing
bisections will invariably land there, so this will help them find a fix
for a real crash. And also, the previous behavior was unlikely to ever
expose this bug--it was fragile, yet not actually broken.
So that's why I chose this commit for the Fixes tag, rather than the
commit that created the original BUG() statement.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230701010442.2041858-1-jhubbard@nvidia.com
Fixes: c33c794828f2 ("mm: ptep_get() conversion")
Signed-off-by: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>
Acked-by: James Houghton <jthoughton@google.com>
Acked-by: Muchun Song <songmuchun@bytedance.com>
Reviewed-by: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com>
Acked-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel@ffwll.ch>
Cc: Dave Airlie <airlied@gmail.com>
Cc: Dimitri Sivanich <dimitri.sivanich@hpe.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes <lstoakes@gmail.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
Cc: Oleksandr Tyshchenko <oleksandr_tyshchenko@epam.com>
Cc: Pavel Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@soleen.com>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev>
Cc: SeongJae Park <sj@kernel.org>
Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Cc: Uladzislau Rezki (Sony) <urezki@gmail.com>
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Cc: Yu Zhao <yuzhao@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Anthony Iliopoulos [Wed, 28 Jun 2023 01:34:37 +0000 (03:34 +0200)]
docs: update ocfs2-devel mailing list address
The ocfs2-devel mailing list has been migrated to the kernel.org
infrastructure, update all related documentation pointers to reflect the
change.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230628013437.47030-3-ailiop@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Anthony Iliopoulos <ailiop@suse.com>
Acked-by: Joseph Qi <jiangqi903@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Gang He <ghe@suse.com>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Anthony Iliopoulos [Wed, 28 Jun 2023 01:34:36 +0000 (03:34 +0200)]
MAINTAINERS: update ocfs2-devel mailing list address
The ocfs2-devel mailing list has been migrated to the kernel.org
infrastructure, update the related entry to reflect the change.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230628013437.47030-2-ailiop@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Anthony Iliopoulos <ailiop@suse.com>
Acked-by: Joseph Qi <jiangqi903@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Gang He <ghe@suse.com>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Suren Baghdasaryan [Thu, 6 Jul 2023 01:14:00 +0000 (18:14 -0700)]
mm: disable CONFIG_PER_VMA_LOCK until its fixed
A memory corruption was reported in [1] with bisection pointing to the
patch [2] enabling per-VMA locks for x86. Disable per-VMA locks config to
prevent this issue until the fix is confirmed. This is expected to be a
temporary measure.
[1] https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=217624
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/all/
20230227173632.
3292573-30-surenb@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230706011400.2949242-3-surenb@google.com
Reported-by: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@kernel.org>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/dbdef34c-3a07-5951-e1ae-e9c6e3cdf51b@kernel.org/
Reported-by: Jacob Young <jacobly.alt@gmail.com>
Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=217624
Fixes: 0bff0aaea03e ("x86/mm: try VMA lock-based page fault handling first")
Signed-off-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Holger Hoffstätte <holger@applied-asynchrony.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Suren Baghdasaryan [Thu, 6 Jul 2023 01:13:59 +0000 (18:13 -0700)]
fork: lock VMAs of the parent process when forking
Patch series "Avoid memory corruption caused by per-VMA locks", v4.
A memory corruption was reported in [1] with bisection pointing to the
patch [2] enabling per-VMA locks for x86. Based on the reproducer
provided in [1] we suspect this is caused by the lack of VMA locking while
forking a child process.
Patch 1/2 in the series implements proper VMA locking during fork. I
tested the fix locally using the reproducer and was unable to reproduce
the memory corruption problem.
This fix can potentially regress some fork-heavy workloads. Kernel build
time did not show noticeable regression on a 56-core machine while a
stress test mapping 10000 VMAs and forking 5000 times in a tight loop
shows ~7% regression. If such fork time regression is unacceptable,
disabling CONFIG_PER_VMA_LOCK should restore its performance. Further
optimizations are possible if this regression proves to be problematic.
Patch 2/2 disables per-VMA locks until the fix is tested and verified.
This patch (of 2):
When forking a child process, parent write-protects an anonymous page and
COW-shares it with the child being forked using copy_present_pte().
Parent's TLB is flushed right before we drop the parent's mmap_lock in
dup_mmap(). If we get a write-fault before that TLB flush in the parent,
and we end up replacing that anonymous page in the parent process in
do_wp_page() (because, COW-shared with the child), this might lead to some
stale writable TLB entries targeting the wrong (old) page. Similar issue
happened in the past with userfaultfd (see flush_tlb_page() call inside
do_wp_page()).
Lock VMAs of the parent process when forking a child, which prevents
concurrent page faults during fork operation and avoids this issue. This
fix can potentially regress some fork-heavy workloads. Kernel build time
did not show noticeable regression on a 56-core machine while a stress
test mapping 10000 VMAs and forking 5000 times in a tight loop shows ~7%
regression. If such fork time regression is unacceptable, disabling
CONFIG_PER_VMA_LOCK should restore its performance. Further optimizations
are possible if this regression proves to be problematic.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230706011400.2949242-1-surenb@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230706011400.2949242-2-surenb@google.com
Fixes: 0bff0aaea03e ("x86/mm: try VMA lock-based page fault handling first")
Signed-off-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Suggested-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@kernel.org>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/dbdef34c-3a07-5951-e1ae-e9c6e3cdf51b@kernel.org/
Reported-by: Holger Hoffstätte <holger@applied-asynchrony.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/b198d649-f4bf-b971-31d0-e8433ec2a34c@applied-asynchrony.com/
Reported-by: Jacob Young <jacobly.alt@gmail.com>
Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3D217624
Reviewed-by: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@oracle.com>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Holger Hoffsttte <holger@applied-asynchrony.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Geoff Levand [Thu, 29 Jun 2023 23:32:44 +0000 (23:32 +0000)]
ntb.rst: Fix copy and paste error
It seems the text for the NTB MSI Test Client section was copied from the
NTB Tool Test Client, but was not updated for the new section. Corrects
the NTB MSI Test Client section text.
Reviewed-by: Logan Gunthorpe <logang@deltatee.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Geoff Levand <geoff@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Jon Mason <jdmason@kudzu.us>
Geoff Levand [Fri, 30 Jun 2023 21:58:46 +0000 (21:58 +0000)]
ntb_netdev: Fix module_init problem
With both the ntb_transport_init and the ntb_netdev_init_module routines in the
module_init init group, the ntb_netdev_init_module routine can be called before
the ntb_transport_init routine that it depends on is called. To assure the
proper initialization order put ntb_netdev_init_module in the late_initcall
group.
Fixes runtime errors where the ntb_netdev_init_module call fails with ENODEV.
Signed-off-by: Geoff Levand <geoff@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Mason <jdmason@kudzu.us>
Cai Huoqing [Fri, 24 Mar 2023 01:32:20 +0000 (09:32 +0800)]
ntb: intel: Remove redundant pci_clear_master
Remove pci_clear_master to simplify the code,
the bus-mastering is also cleared in do_pci_disable_device,
like this:
./drivers/pci/pci.c:2197
static void do_pci_disable_device(struct pci_dev *dev)
{
u16 pci_command;
pci_read_config_word(dev, PCI_COMMAND, &pci_command);
if (pci_command & PCI_COMMAND_MASTER) {
pci_command &= ~PCI_COMMAND_MASTER;
pci_write_config_word(dev, PCI_COMMAND, pci_command);
}
pcibios_disable_device(dev);
}.
And dev->is_busmaster is set to 0 in pci_disable_device.
Signed-off-by: Cai Huoqing <cai.huoqing@linux.dev>
Acked-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Mason <jdmason@kudzu.us>
Cai Huoqing [Fri, 24 Mar 2023 01:32:19 +0000 (09:32 +0800)]
ntb: epf: Remove redundant pci_clear_master
Remove pci_clear_master to simplify the code,
the bus-mastering is also cleared in do_pci_disable_device,
like this:
./drivers/pci/pci.c:2197
static void do_pci_disable_device(struct pci_dev *dev)
{
u16 pci_command;
pci_read_config_word(dev, PCI_COMMAND, &pci_command);
if (pci_command & PCI_COMMAND_MASTER) {
pci_command &= ~PCI_COMMAND_MASTER;
pci_write_config_word(dev, PCI_COMMAND, pci_command);
}
pcibios_disable_device(dev);
}.
And dev->is_busmaster is set to 0 in pci_disable_device.
Signed-off-by: Cai Huoqing <cai.huoqing@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Jon Mason <jdmason@kudzu.us>
Cai Huoqing [Fri, 24 Mar 2023 01:32:18 +0000 (09:32 +0800)]
ntb_hw_amd: Remove redundant pci_clear_master
Remove pci_clear_master to simplify the code,
the bus-mastering is also cleared in do_pci_disable_device,
like this:
./drivers/pci/pci.c:2197
static void do_pci_disable_device(struct pci_dev *dev)
{
u16 pci_command;
pci_read_config_word(dev, PCI_COMMAND, &pci_command);
if (pci_command & PCI_COMMAND_MASTER) {
pci_command &= ~PCI_COMMAND_MASTER;
pci_write_config_word(dev, PCI_COMMAND, pci_command);
}
pcibios_disable_device(dev);
}.
And dev->is_busmaster is set to 0 in pci_disable_device.
Signed-off-by: Cai Huoqing <cai.huoqing@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Jon Mason <jdmason@kudzu.us>
Bjorn Helgaas [Tue, 7 Mar 2023 20:30:21 +0000 (14:30 -0600)]
ntb: idt: drop redundant pci_enable_pcie_error_reporting()
pci_enable_pcie_error_reporting() enables the device to send ERR_*
Messages. Since
f26e58bf6f54 ("PCI/AER: Enable error reporting when AER is
native"), the PCI core does this for all devices during enumeration, so the
driver doesn't need to do it itself.
Remove the redundant pci_enable_pcie_error_reporting() call from the
driver. Also remove the corresponding pci_disable_pcie_error_reporting()
from the driver .remove() path.
Note that this only controls ERR_* Messages from the device. An ERR_*
Message may cause the Root Port to generate an interrupt, depending on the
AER Root Error Command register managed by the AER service driver.
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Acked-by: Serge Semin <fancer.lancer@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Mason <jdmason@kudzu.us>
Palmer Dabbelt [Thu, 13 Oct 2022 21:46:38 +0000 (14:46 -0700)]
MAINTAINERS: git://github -> https://github.com for jonmason
Github deprecated the git:// links about a year ago, so let's move to
the https:// URLs instead.
Reported-by: Conor Dooley <conor.dooley@microchip.com>
Link: https://github.blog/2021-09-01-improving-git-protocol-security-github/
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Mason <jdmason@kudzu.us>
ruanjinjie [Wed, 9 Nov 2022 09:28:52 +0000 (17:28 +0800)]
NTB: EPF: fix possible memory leak in pci_vntb_probe()
As ntb_register_device() don't handle error of device_register(),
if ntb_register_device() returns error in pci_vntb_probe(), name of kobject
which is allocated in dev_set_name() called in device_add() is leaked.
As comment of device_add() says, it should call put_device() to drop the
reference count that was set in device_initialize()
when it fails, so the name can be freed in kobject_cleanup().
Signed-off-by: ruanjinjie <ruanjinjie@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Mason <jdmason@kudzu.us>
Jiasheng Jiang [Tue, 22 Nov 2022 03:32:44 +0000 (11:32 +0800)]
NTB: ntb_tool: Add check for devm_kcalloc
As the devm_kcalloc may return NULL pointer,
it should be better to add check for the return
value, as same as the others.
Fixes: 7f46c8b3a552 ("NTB: ntb_tool: Add full multi-port NTB API support")
Signed-off-by: Jiasheng Jiang <jiasheng@iscas.ac.cn>
Reviewed-by: Serge Semin <fancer.lancer@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Mason <jdmason@kudzu.us>
Yang Yingliang [Thu, 10 Nov 2022 15:19:17 +0000 (23:19 +0800)]
NTB: ntb_transport: fix possible memory leak while device_register() fails
If device_register() returns error, the name allocated by
dev_set_name() need be freed. As comment of device_register()
says, it should use put_device() to give up the reference in
the error path. So fix this by calling put_device(), then the
name can be freed in kobject_cleanup(), and client_dev is freed
in ntb_transport_client_release().
Fixes: fce8a7bb5b4b ("PCI-Express Non-Transparent Bridge Support")
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Mason <jdmason@kudzu.us>
Yuan Can [Sat, 5 Nov 2022 09:43:22 +0000 (09:43 +0000)]
ntb: intel: Fix error handling in intel_ntb_pci_driver_init()
A problem about ntb_hw_intel create debugfs failed is triggered with the
following log given:
[ 273.112733] Intel(R) PCI-E Non-Transparent Bridge Driver 2.0
[ 273.115342] debugfs: Directory 'ntb_hw_intel' with parent '/' already present!
The reason is that intel_ntb_pci_driver_init() returns
pci_register_driver() directly without checking its return value, if
pci_register_driver() failed, it returns without destroy the newly created
debugfs, resulting the debugfs of ntb_hw_intel can never be created later.
intel_ntb_pci_driver_init()
debugfs_create_dir() # create debugfs directory
pci_register_driver()
driver_register()
bus_add_driver()
priv = kzalloc(...) # OOM happened
# return without destroy debugfs directory
Fix by removing debugfs when pci_register_driver() returns error.
Fixes: e26a5843f7f5 ("NTB: Split ntb_hw_intel and ntb_transport drivers")
Signed-off-by: Yuan Can <yuancan@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Mason <jdmason@kudzu.us>
Yuan Can [Sat, 5 Nov 2022 09:43:09 +0000 (09:43 +0000)]
NTB: amd: Fix error handling in amd_ntb_pci_driver_init()
A problem about ntb_hw_amd create debugfs failed is triggered with the
following log given:
[ 618.431232] AMD(R) PCI-E Non-Transparent Bridge Driver 1.0
[ 618.433284] debugfs: Directory 'ntb_hw_amd' with parent '/' already present!
The reason is that amd_ntb_pci_driver_init() returns pci_register_driver()
directly without checking its return value, if pci_register_driver()
failed, it returns without destroy the newly created debugfs, resulting
the debugfs of ntb_hw_amd can never be created later.
amd_ntb_pci_driver_init()
debugfs_create_dir() # create debugfs directory
pci_register_driver()
driver_register()
bus_add_driver()
priv = kzalloc(...) # OOM happened
# return without destroy debugfs directory
Fix by removing debugfs when pci_register_driver() returns error.
Fixes: a1b3695820aa ("NTB: Add support for AMD PCI-Express Non-Transparent Bridge")
Signed-off-by: Yuan Can <yuancan@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Mason <jdmason@kudzu.us>
Yuan Can [Sat, 5 Nov 2022 09:43:01 +0000 (09:43 +0000)]
ntb: idt: Fix error handling in idt_pci_driver_init()
A problem about ntb_hw_idt create debugfs failed is triggered with the
following log given:
[ 1236.637636] IDT PCI-E Non-Transparent Bridge Driver 2.0
[ 1236.639292] debugfs: Directory 'ntb_hw_idt' with parent '/' already present!
The reason is that idt_pci_driver_init() returns pci_register_driver()
directly without checking its return value, if pci_register_driver()
failed, it returns without destroy the newly created debugfs, resulting
the debugfs of ntb_hw_idt can never be created later.
idt_pci_driver_init()
debugfs_create_dir() # create debugfs directory
pci_register_driver()
driver_register()
bus_add_driver()
priv = kzalloc(...) # OOM happened
# return without destroy debugfs directory
Fix by removing debugfs when pci_register_driver() returns error.
Fixes: bf2a952d31d2 ("NTB: Add IDT 89HPESxNTx PCIe-switches support")
Signed-off-by: Yuan Can <yuancan@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Mason <jdmason@kudzu.us>
Darrick J. Wong [Fri, 7 Jul 2023 01:00:59 +0000 (18:00 -0700)]
xfs: fix uninit warning in xfs_growfs_data
Quiet down this gcc warning:
fs/xfs/xfs_fsops.c: In function ‘xfs_growfs_data’:
fs/xfs/xfs_fsops.c:219:21: error: ‘lastag_extended’ may be used uninitialized in this function [-Werror=maybe-uninitialized]
219 | if (lastag_extended) {
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
fs/xfs/xfs_fsops.c:100:33: note: ‘lastag_extended’ was declared here
100 | bool lastag_extended;
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
By setting its value explicitly. From code analysis I don't think this
is a real problem, but I have better things to do than analyse this
closely.
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Linus Torvalds [Fri, 7 Jul 2023 22:59:33 +0000 (15:59 -0700)]
Merge tag 'mmc-v6.5-2' of git://git./linux/kernel/git/ulfh/mmc
Pull mmc fix from Ulf Hansson:
- Fix regression of detection of eMMC/SD/SDIO cards
* tag 'mmc-v6.5-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ulfh/mmc:
mmc: Revert "mmc: core: Allow mmc_start_host() synchronously detect a card"
Linus Torvalds [Fri, 7 Jul 2023 22:40:17 +0000 (15:40 -0700)]
Merge tag 'sound-fix-6.5-rc1' of git://git./linux/kernel/git/tiwai/sound
Pull sound fixes from Takashi Iwai:
"A collection of small fixes that have been gathered recently:
- Two code-typo fixes in the new UMP core
- A fix in jack reporting to avoid the usage of mutex
- A potential data race fix in HD-audio core regmap code
- A potential data race fix in PCM allocation helper code
- HD-audio quirks for ASUS, Clevo and Unis machines
- Constifications in FireWire drivers"
* tag 'sound-fix-6.5-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tiwai/sound:
ALSA: hda/realtek: Add quirk for ASUS ROG GZ301V
ALSA: jack: Fix mutex call in snd_jack_report()
ALSA: seq: ump: fix typo in system_2p_ev_to_ump_midi1()
ALSA: hda/realtek: Whitespace fix
ALSA: hda/realtek: Add quirk for ASUS ROG G614Jx
ALSA: hda/realtek: Amend G634 quirk to enable rear speakers
ALSA: hda/realtek: Add quirk for ASUS ROG GA402X
ALSA: hda/realtek: Add quirk for ASUS ROG GX650P
ALSA: pcm: Fix potential data race at PCM memory allocation helpers
ALSA: hda: fix a possible null-pointer dereference due to data race in snd_hdac_regmap_sync()
ALSA: hda/realtek: Add quirks for Unis H3C Desktop B760 & Q760
ALSA: hda/realtek: Add quirk for Clevo NPx0SNx
ALSA: ump: Correct wrong byte size at converting a UMP System message
ALSA: fireface: make read-only const array for model names static
ALSA: oxfw: make read-only const array models static
Linus Torvalds [Fri, 7 Jul 2023 22:07:20 +0000 (15:07 -0700)]
Merge tag 'ceph-for-6.5-rc1' of https://github.com/ceph/ceph-client
Pull ceph updates from Ilya Dryomov:
"A bunch of CephFS fixups from Xiubo, mostly around dropping caps,
along with a fix for a regression in the readahead handling code which
sneaked in with the switch to netfs helpers"
* tag 'ceph-for-6.5-rc1' of https://github.com/ceph/ceph-client:
ceph: don't let check_caps skip sending responses for revoke msgs
ceph: issue a cap release immediately if no cap exists
ceph: trigger to flush the buffer when making snapshot
ceph: fix blindly expanding the readahead windows
ceph: add a dedicated private data for netfs rreq
ceph: voluntarily drop Xx caps for requests those touch parent mtime
ceph: try to dump the msgs when decoding fails
ceph: only send metrics when the MDS rank is ready
Linus Torvalds [Fri, 7 Jul 2023 21:59:38 +0000 (14:59 -0700)]
Merge tag 'ntfs3_for_6.5' of https://github.com/Paragon-Software-Group/linux-ntfs3
Pull ntfs3 updates from Konstantin Komarov:
"Updates:
- support /proc/fs/ntfs3/<dev>/volinfo and label
- alternative boot if primary boot is corrupted
- small optimizations
Fixes:
- fix endian problems
- fix logic errors
- code refactoring and reformatting"
* tag 'ntfs3_for_6.5' of https://github.com/Paragon-Software-Group/linux-ntfs3:
fs/ntfs3: Correct mode for label entry inside /proc/fs/ntfs3/
fs/ntfs3: Add support /proc/fs/ntfs3/<dev>/volinfo and /proc/fs/ntfs3/<dev>/label
fs/ntfs3: Fix endian problem
fs/ntfs3: Add ability to format new mft records with bigger/smaller header
fs/ntfs3: Code refactoring
fs/ntfs3: Code formatting
fs/ntfs3: Do not update primary boot in ntfs_init_from_boot()
fs/ntfs3: Alternative boot if primary boot is corrupted
fs/ntfs3: Mark ntfs dirty when on-disk struct is corrupted
fs/ntfs3: Fix ntfs_atomic_open
fs/ntfs3: Correct checking while generating attr_list
fs/ntfs3: Use __GFP_NOWARN allocation at ntfs_load_attr_list()
fs: ntfs3: Fix possible null-pointer dereferences in mi_read()
fs/ntfs3: Return error for inconsistent extended attributes
fs/ntfs3: Enhance sanity check while generating attr_list
fs/ntfs3: Use wrapper i_blocksize() in ntfs_zero_range()
ntfs: Fix panic about slab-out-of-bounds caused by ntfs_listxattr()
Linus Torvalds [Fri, 7 Jul 2023 21:51:37 +0000 (14:51 -0700)]
Merge tag 'fsnotify_for_v6.5-rc2' of git://git./linux/kernel/git/jack/linux-fs
Pull fsnotify fix from Jan Kara:
"A fix for fanotify to disallow creating of mount or superblock marks
for kernel internal pseudo filesystems"
* tag 'fsnotify_for_v6.5-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jack/linux-fs:
fanotify: disallow mount/sb marks on kernel internal pseudo fs
Linus Torvalds [Fri, 7 Jul 2023 17:07:19 +0000 (10:07 -0700)]
Merge tag 'riscv-for-linus-6.5-mw2' of git://git./linux/kernel/git/riscv/linux
Pull more RISC-V updates from Palmer Dabbelt:
- A bunch of fixes/cleanups from the first part of the merge window,
mostly related to ACPI and vector as those were large
- Some documentation improvements, mostly related to the new code
- The "riscv,isa" DT key is deprecated
- Support for link-time dead code elimination
- Support for minor fault registration in userfaultd
- A handful of cleanups around CMO alternatives
* tag 'riscv-for-linus-6.5-mw2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/riscv/linux: (23 commits)
riscv: mm: mark noncoherent_supported as __ro_after_init
riscv: mm: mark CBO relate initialization funcs as __init
riscv: errata: thead: only set cbom size & noncoherent during boot
riscv: Select HAVE_ARCH_USERFAULTFD_MINOR
RISC-V: Document the ISA string parsing rules for ACPI
risc-v: Fix order of IPI enablement vs RCU startup
mm: riscv: fix an unsafe pte read in huge_pte_alloc()
dt-bindings: riscv: deprecate riscv,isa
RISC-V: drop error print from riscv_hartid_to_cpuid()
riscv: Discard vector state on syscalls
riscv: move memblock_allow_resize() after linear mapping is ready
riscv: Enable ARCH_SUSPEND_POSSIBLE for s2idle
riscv: vdso: include vdso/vsyscall.h for vdso_data
selftests: Test RISC-V Vector's first-use handler
riscv: vector: clear V-reg in the first-use trap
riscv: vector: only enable interrupts in the first-use trap
RISC-V: Fix up some vector state related build failures
RISC-V: Document that V registers are clobbered on syscalls
riscv: disable HAVE_LD_DEAD_CODE_DATA_ELIMINATION for LLD
riscv: enable HAVE_LD_DEAD_CODE_DATA_ELIMINATION
...
Linus Torvalds [Fri, 7 Jul 2023 17:00:30 +0000 (10:00 -0700)]
Merge tag 'powerpc-6.5-2' of git://git./linux/kernel/git/powerpc/linux
Pull powerpc fixes from Michael Ellerman:
- Fix PCIe MEM size for pci2 node on Turris 1.x boards
- Two minor build fixes
Thanks to Christophe Leroy, Douglas Anderson, Pali Rohár, Petr Mladek,
and Randy Dunlap.
* tag 'powerpc-6.5-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/powerpc/linux:
powerpc: dts: turris1x.dts: Fix PCIe MEM size for pci2 node
powerpc: Include asm/nmi.c in mobility.c for watchdog_hardlockup_set_timeout_pct()
powerpc: allow PPC_EARLY_DEBUG_CPM only when SERIAL_CPM=y
Linus Torvalds [Fri, 7 Jul 2023 16:55:31 +0000 (09:55 -0700)]
Merge tag 'apparmor-pr-2023-07-06' of git://git./linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor
Pull apparmor updates from John Johansen:
- fix missing error check for rhashtable_insert_fast
- add missing failure check in compute_xmatch_perms
- fix policy_compat permission remap with extended permissions
- fix profile verification and enable it
- fix kzalloc perms tables for shared dfas
- Fix kernel-doc header for verify_dfa_accept_index
- aa_buffer: Convert 1-element array to flexible array
- Return directly after a failed kzalloc() in two functions
- fix use of strcpy in policy_unpack_test
- fix kernel-doc complaints
- Fix some kernel-doc comments
* tag 'apparmor-pr-2023-07-06' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor:
apparmor: Fix kernel-doc header for verify_dfa_accept_index
apparmor: fix: kzalloc perms tables for shared dfas
apparmor: fix profile verification and enable it
apparmor: fix policy_compat permission remap with extended permissions
apparmor: aa_buffer: Convert 1-element array to flexible array
apparmor: add missing failure check in compute_xmatch_perms
apparmor: fix missing error check for rhashtable_insert_fast
apparmor: Return directly after a failed kzalloc() in two functions
AppArmor: Fix some kernel-doc comments
apparmor: fix use of strcpy in policy_unpack_test
apparmor: fix kernel-doc complaints
Thomas Gleixner [Wed, 5 Jul 2023 08:59:23 +0000 (10:59 +0200)]
x86/smp: Don't send INIT to boot CPU
Parking CPUs in INIT works well, except for the crash case when the CPU
which invokes smp_park_other_cpus_in_init() is not the boot CPU. Sending
INIT to the boot CPU resets the whole machine.
Prevent this by validating that this runs on the boot CPU. If not fall back
and let CPUs hang in HLT.
Fixes: 45e34c8af58f ("x86/smp: Put CPUs into INIT on shutdown if possible")
Reported-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/87ttui91jo.ffs@tglx
Thomas Bogendoerfer [Thu, 6 Jul 2023 16:36:10 +0000 (18:36 +0200)]
MIPS: kvm: Fix build error with KVM_MIPS_DEBUG_COP0_COUNTERS enabled
Commit
e4de20576986 ("MIPS: KVM: Fix NULL pointer dereference") missed
converting one place accessing cop0 registers, which results in a build
error, if KVM_MIPS_DEBUG_COP0_COUNTERS is enabled.
Fixes: e4de20576986 ("MIPS: KVM: Fix NULL pointer dereference")
Signed-off-by: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@linaro.org>
Luke D. Jones [Thu, 6 Jul 2023 22:33:23 +0000 (10:33 +1200)]
ALSA: hda/realtek: Add quirk for ASUS ROG GZ301V
Adds the required quirk to enable the Cirrus amp and correct pins
on the ASUS ROG GZ301V series which uses an SPI connected Cirrus amp.
While this works if the related _DSD properties are made available, these
aren't included in the ACPI of these laptops (yet).
Signed-off-by: Luke D. Jones <luke@ljones.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230706223323.30871-2-luke@ljones.dev
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Linus Torvalds [Fri, 7 Jul 2023 05:42:54 +0000 (22:42 -0700)]
Merge tag 'drm-next-2023-07-07' of git://anongit.freedesktop.org/drm/drm
Pull drm fixes from Dave Airlie:
"Lots of fixes, mostly i915 and amdgpu. It's two weeks of i915, and I
think three weeks of amdgpu.
fbdev:
- Fix module infos on sparc
panel:
- Fix mode on Starry-ili9882t
i915:
- Allow DC states along with PW2 only for PWB functionality [adlp+]
- Fix SSC selection for MPLLA [mtl]
- Use hw.adjusted mode when calculating io/fast wake times [psr]
- Apply min softlimit correctly [guc/slpc]
- Assign correct hdcp content type [hdcp]
- Add missing forward declarations/includes to display power headers
- Fix BDW PSR AUX CH data register offsets [psr]
- Use mock device info for creating mock device
amdgpu:
- Misc cleanups
- GFX 9.4.3 fixes
- DEBUGFS build fix
- Fix LPDDR5 reporting
- ASPM fixes
- DCN 3.1.4 fixes
- DP MST fixes
- DCN 3.2.x fixes
- Display PSR TCON fixes
- SMU 13.x fixes
- RAS fixes
- Vega12/20 SMU fixes
- PSP flashing cleanup
- GFX9 MCBP fixes
- SR-IOV fixes
- GPUVM clear mappings fix for always valid BOs
- Add FAMS quirk for problematic monitor
- Fix possible UAF
- Better handle monentary temperature fluctuations
- SDMA 4.4.2 fixes
- Fencing fix"
* tag 'drm-next-2023-07-07' of git://anongit.freedesktop.org/drm/drm: (83 commits)
drm/i915: use mock device info for creating mock device
drm/i915/psr: Fix BDW PSR AUX CH data register offsets
drm/amdgpu: Fix potential fence use-after-free v2
drm/amd/pm: avoid unintentional shutdown due to temperature momentary fluctuation
drm/amd/pm: expose swctf threshold setting for legacy powerplay
drm/amd/display: 3.2.241
drm/amd/display: Take full update path if number of planes changed
drm/amd/display: Create debugging mechanism for Gaming FAMS
drm/amd/display: Add monitor specific edid quirk
drm/amd/display: For new fast update path, loop through each surface
drm/amd/display: Remove Phantom Pipe Check When Calculating K1 and K2
drm/amd/display: Limit new fast update path to addr and gamma / color
drm/amd/display: Fix the delta clamping for shaper LUT
drm/amdgpu: Keep non-psp path for partition switch
drm/amd/display: program DPP shaper and 3D LUT if updated
Revert "drm/amd/display: edp do not add non-edid timings"
drm/amdgpu: share drm device for pci amdgpu device with 1st partition device
drm/amd/pm: Add GFX v9.4.3 unique id to sysfs
drm/amd/pm: Enable pp_feature attribute
drm/amdgpu/vcn: Need to unpause dpg before stop dpg
...
Linus Torvalds [Fri, 7 Jul 2023 05:25:06 +0000 (22:25 -0700)]
Merge tag 'acpi-6.5-rc1-3' of git://git./linux/kernel/git/rafael/linux-pm
Pull more ACPI updates from Rafael Wysocki:
"These fix a couple of compiler warnings, refine an ACPI device
enumeration quirk to address a driver regression and clean up code.
Specifics:
- Make acpi_companion_match() return a const pointer and update its
callers accordingly (Andy Shevchenko)
- Move the extern declaration of the acpi_root variable to a header
file so as to address a compiler warning (Andy Shevchenko)
- Address compiler warnings in the ACPI device enumeration code by
adding a missing header file include to it (Ben Dooks)
- Refine the SMB0001 quirk in the ACPI device enumeration code so as
to address an i2c-scmi driver regression (Andy Shevchenko)
- Clean up two pieces of the ACPI device enumeration code (Andy
Shevchenko)"
* tag 'acpi-6.5-rc1-3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rafael/linux-pm:
ACPI: scan: Use the acpi_match_acpi_device() helper
ACPI: platform: Move SMB0001 HID to the header and reuse
ACPI: platform: Ignore SMB0001 only when it has resources
ACPI: bus: Introduce acpi_match_acpi_device() helper
ACPI: scan: fix undeclared variable warnings by including sleep.h
ACPI: bus: Constify acpi_companion_match() returned value
ACPI: scan: Move acpi_root to internal header
Linus Torvalds [Fri, 7 Jul 2023 05:15:38 +0000 (22:15 -0700)]
Merge tag 'docs-6.5-2' of git://git.lwn.net/linux
Pull mode documentation updates from Jonathan Corbet:
"A half-dozen late arriving docs patches. They are mostly fixes, but we
also have a kernel-doc tweak for enums and the long-overdue removal of
the outdated and redundant patch-submission comments at the top of the
MAINTAINERS file"
* tag 'docs-6.5-2' of git://git.lwn.net/linux:
scripts: kernel-doc: support private / public marking for enums
Documentation: KVM: SEV: add a missing backtick
Documentation: ACPI: fix typo in ssdt-overlays.rst
Fix documentation of panic_on_warn
docs: remove the tips on how to submit patches from MAINTAINERS
docs: fix typo in zh_TW and zh_CN translation
Linus Torvalds [Fri, 7 Jul 2023 02:24:11 +0000 (19:24 -0700)]
Merge tag 'spi-fix-v6.5-merge-window' of git://git./linux/kernel/git/broonie/spi
Pull spi fixes from Mark Brown:
"A few mostly minor fixes that came in during the merge window, plus
one administrative update for Jonas' e-mail address.
The spi-geni-qcom fix is more major than the others, fixing the newly
added DMA support for large reads which trigger DMA"
* tag 'spi-fix-v6.5-merge-window' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/broonie/spi:
spi: bcm{63xx,bca}-hsspi: update my email address
spi: rzv2m-csi: Fix SoC product name
spi: bcm-qspi: return error if neither hif_mspi nor mspi is available
spi: spi-geni-qcom: enable SPI_CONTROLLER_MUST_TX for GPI DMA mode
Linus Torvalds [Fri, 7 Jul 2023 02:20:23 +0000 (19:20 -0700)]
Merge tag 'regulator-fix-v6.5-merge-window' of git://git./linux/kernel/git/broonie/regulator
Pull regulator fix from Mark Brown:
"A simple dependency fix for a newly added driver"
* tag 'regulator-fix-v6.5-merge-window' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/broonie/regulator:
regulator: raa215300: Add build dependency with COMMON_CLK
Linus Torvalds [Fri, 7 Jul 2023 02:07:15 +0000 (19:07 -0700)]
Merge tag 'trace-v6.5-2' of git://git./linux/kernel/git/trace/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
- Fix bad git merge of #endif in arm64 code
A merge of the arm64 tree caused #endif to go into the wrong place
- Fix crash on lseek of write access to tracefs/error_log
Opening error_log as write only, and then doing an lseek() causes a
kernel panic, because the lseek() handle expects a "seq_file" to
exist (which is not done on write only opens). Use tracing_lseek()
that tests for this instead of calling the default seq lseek handler.
- Check for negative instead of -E2BIG for error on strscpy() returns
Instead of testing for -E2BIG from strscpy(), to be more robust,
check for less than zero, which will make sure it catches any error
that strscpy() may someday return.
* tag 'trace-v6.5-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/trace/linux-trace:
tracing/boot: Test strscpy() against less than zero for error
arm64: ftrace: fix build error with CONFIG_FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER=n
tracing: Fix null pointer dereference in tracing_err_log_open()
Linus Torvalds [Fri, 7 Jul 2023 02:01:38 +0000 (19:01 -0700)]
Merge tag 'v6.5/vfs.fixes.2' of git://git./linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs
Pull vfs fixes from Christian Brauner:
"This contains two minor fixes for Jan's rename locking work:
- Unlocking the source inode was guarded by a check whether source
was non-NULL. This doesn't make sense because source must be
non-NULL and the commit message explains in detail why
- The lock_two_nondirectories() helper called WARN_ON_ONCE() and
dereferenced the inodes unconditionally but the underlying
lock_two_inodes() helper and the kernel documentation for that
function are clear that it is valid to pass NULL arguments, so a
non-NULL check is needed. No callers currently pass NULL arguments
but let's not knowingly leave landmines around"
* tag 'v6.5/vfs.fixes.2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs:
fs: don't assume arguments are non-NULL
fs: no need to check source
Dave Airlie [Fri, 7 Jul 2023 01:05:09 +0000 (11:05 +1000)]
Merge tag 'drm-misc-next-fixes-2023-07-06' of git://anongit.freedesktop.org/drm/drm-misc into drm-next
Short summary of fixes pull:
* panel: Fix mode on Starry-ili9882t
Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>
From: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20230706112203.GA30555@linux-uq9g
Dave Airlie [Fri, 7 Jul 2023 00:52:23 +0000 (10:52 +1000)]
Merge tag 'drm-intel-next-fixes-2023-07-06' of git://anongit.freedesktop.org/drm/drm-intel into drm-next
- Fix BDW PSR AUX CH data register offsets [psr] (Ville Syrjälä)
- Use mock device info for creating mock device (Jani Nikula)
Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>
From: Tvrtko Ursulin <tvrtko.ursulin@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/ZKZ6VIeInBYrBuph@tursulin-desk
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